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THE 1988 WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT-AN INTRODUCTION
William R. Andersen*
Abstract: The Washington Legislature passed a new Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") in the spring of 1988, effective July 1, 1989. The Article guides the reader
through the new APA, discusses its connection to general principles of administrative law
and the policies underlying the Act, describes its organization, suggests solutions to inter-
pretative problems, and recommends methods for evaluating future proposed amendments
to the Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years have passed since Washington first adopted an admin-
istrative procedure act.' In that period of time, a number of basic
changes have occurred in the nature and magnitude of state govern-
ment. In the 1960's, state governments had a limited role in such mat-
ters as environmental protection, energy conservation, and safety in
the workplace. Today, most states have separate state agencies for
such functions. A substantial growth in public welfare programs also
has occurred since the early 1960's, requiring large state agencies with
staggering caseloads and putting obvious stress on a procedural system
designed for another age.
In addition, our knowledge of the process has grown. There has
been an outpouring of scholarly literature. There have been new polit-
ical perspectives on the role of government generally and on adminis-
trative regulation specifically. There have been important changes in
judicial perceptions about the administrative process and substantial
experimentation in various state legislatures.2
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. Professor Andersen was a member of the
Washington Bar Association Task Force which proposed the new Administrative Procedure Act
to the state legislature. The views expressed in the Article are the views of the author and are not
intended to represent the views of the bar association, the Task Force or the University of
Washington.
1. 1959 Washington Laws chap. 234 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.04.'010-.950
(1987)).
2. The literature on these matters is voluminous and diverse. Typical discussions in
conventional legal materials include DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the
Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REv. 399 (1986); McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory
Reform, 65 Tax L. REV. 1243 (1987); Sargenitch, The Reform of the American Administrative
Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 385; Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1985).
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In the late 1970's, in response to forces such as these, two interre-
lated developments began. First, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws began a study of a new Model
Administrative Procedure Act to replace the 1961 model widely
adopted in the United States. Second, a task force of the Washington
State Bar Association began a similar study of the Washington
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). When the new Model Act
was published in 1981,' the Washington Task Force adopted it as a
check list of relevant issues and began a systematic comparison of the
Model Act with the existing Washington act.4 The task was to see, in
the case of each subject treated, whether the Model Act, the existing
act, or some new provision best met the needs for a modern APA for
Washington.
The Task Force itself was small, was composed of essentially the
same members throughout its ten-year life, and was intentionally
diverse.5 The underlying policies the Task Force sought to incorpo-
rate in the new Act included such goals as increasing agency accounta-
bility, improving agency responsiveness, building flexibility, separating
inconsistent functions, protecting agency discretion, improving the
process of judicial review, and broadening the Act's coverage. 6
More broadly, it is recognized that administrative procedure acts
function as a form of "constitution" for the states' agencies, mandat-
ing techniques through which the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government exercise their necessary control over agency
discretion. The kind of general and durable constraints imposed on
the agencies by these "constitutions" include such things as require-
ments that agencies hear appropriately from persons affected by
agency action, that agencies consider adequately what they hear, and
that agencies explain carefully the rationale for their actions. Such
requirements not only help confine agency discretion directly, but they
also furnish the processes of executive, legislative and judicial review
of agency action.7
3. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (Uniform Law Commissioners 1981)
[hereinafter MODEL ACT].
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04 (1987).
5. The Task Force was composed of a practitioner representing business clients (who served
as Chair), a practitioner representing low income clients, a lawyer representing a large state
agency, an academic, and a lay person broadly experienced in government matters.
6. See Statement of the Author, Presented to the Washington State House Committee on the
Judiciary (March 23, 1987) (copy on file with Washington Law Review).
7. See generally Arnold, Political Control of Administrative Officials, 3 J. LAW., ECON., &
ORG. 279 (1987).
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As the beginnings of a new act started to take shape, drafts were
circulated among the state's agencies. Extensive reports were received
and lively discussions ensued. In the fourth year of this dialogue, a bill
was ready for introduction into the state legislature. The legislative
process-including hearings, staff meetings, conferences, work ses-
sions, bargaining discussions, and seemingly endless redrafting-occu-
pied three more years. The bill enacted in the spring of 1988 was the
result.8 It created a new administrative procedure act, wholly replac-
ing the old act. The new Act will appear in Title 34 of the Code as
Chapter 34.05.1 Its effective date was July 1, 1989.
This Article is not intended as a comprehensive and detailed
description of the new Act. Nor is it intended as an authoritative leg-
islative history. Neither of those functions could be performed in the
pages available here. Instead, the Article is a guide and a supplement,
intended to be helpful to the user of the new Act who seeks to under-
stand its basic organization and pattern, its connection to some of the
general principles of administrative law, and some of the underlying
policies which the Act seeks to further.
II. DEFINITIONS
The definitional sections of a complex act of this sort are important
because these sections determine much of the effect of later provisions.
The Act begins with several important rules of construction. 10
First, the Act should be interpreted to achieve consistency with other
states, with interpretations of the federal administrative procedure act,
and with interpretations of model acts. This potentially far-reaching
construction rule makes pertinent in Washington all federal decisions
interpreting similar provisions of the federal APA and all decisions of
other state courts interpreting their acts, including those that adopt
provisions patterned on the Model Act.
Second, the Act should be interpreted to provide greater public and
legislative access to administrative decision making. As discussed
below, enlarging access to administrative materials was one of the
principal objectives of the new Act, and the interpretation of a number
of the Act's provisions will be influenced by this rule of construction.
Third, where possible the Act should be interpreted to achieve con-
sistency with existing Washington administrative practices and
8. 1988 Wash. Laws chap. 288. A technical "clean up" bill was enacted in 1989. See
Engrossed H.B. 1358, 51st Sess. (1989).
9. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 34.05.001-.902 (Supp. 1988).
10. Id. § 34.05.001.
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existing judicial interpretations. Existing Washington case law thus
retains its relevance unless the new Act "clearly requires otherwise."
Fourth, the Act is not affected by subsequent legislation governing
administrative procedure unless the later legislation expressly states
that the Act is affected.'t
The following remarks do not touch all the definitions in the Act,
but only those where significant change was made, or those which are
central to understanding the basic statutory plan. Treated here are the
definitions of agency, agency action, interpretive and policy state-
ments, rules, and adjudicative proceedings.
A. What Is an Agency?
1. Generally
One of the operating assumptions of a general administrative proce-
dure act is that it should apply as broadly as possible. The values
sought in such an act-simplicity, clarity, and consistency-are fos-
tered when more rather than fewer of the state's administrative units
are brought within one act.
On the other hand, there is a natural desire of many agencies to be
separated out from the general lot, and to be treated specially."2
Agencies point to their special mission, the special values they are
charged with furthering, the special constituencies they must respond
to, the special technical expertise they are expected to have, the special
nature of their regulatory context-all as grounds for separate
treatment.
But the plain truth is that so far as rulemaking and adjudication
procedures go, agency functions have much in common. To the extent
those common characteristics can be sensibly captured in widely appli-
cable statutory provisions, the system as a whole takes on a clarity, a
consistency and a simplicity it could not otherwise have.
11. Id. § 34.05.020.
12. This phenomenon is not peculiar to Washington. As David Frohnmayer, a former
Oregon state legislator and state attorney general once put it:
[a] principal objective of advocates of state administrative procedure acts is to bring
uniformity to agency procedures. A principal reaction of state agencies usually is to resist
that drive for uniformity. Consequently, the number of exemptions to any such act is an
index of the persuasiveness of agencies' asserted needs for unique procedures, of the personal
experience of legislators with particular agencies, of the political clout of agencies and their
client groups, or of all three.
FROHNMAYER, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act: An Essay on State Administrative
Rulemaking Procedure Reform, 58 OR. L. REV. 411, 427 (1980).
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Differences cannot, of course, be ignored. But differences should be
treated surgically-with special provisions varying the effect of the rel-
evant provisions of the Act-not with wholesale exemption of the
entire agency. And the experience nationally seems to have been that
the complete exemption of an agency leads only to a rush of claims for
exemption by other agencies. 3 In general, the legislature followed
this surgical approach, giving the term "agency" a very wide defini-
tion, but providing variations for particular functions of particular
agencies when the need for different treatment was demonstrated.
This also would appear the better strategy for the future as new
agencies are created, new powers are conferred, or existing agencies
seek exemption. Where the need for different treatment is demon-
strated objectively, the legislative response should be precisely drafted,
neutrally described exemptions which apply to any agency facing simi-
lar circumstances
2. The Definition of an Agency
Section 34.05.010's definition of agency is taken largely from the old
act and extends the provisions of the statute to all state boards, com-
missions, departments, or officers authorized by law to make rules or
adjudicate cases. There are several matters worthy of note.
First, the limitation to agencies that make rules or decide adjudica-
tions is of uncertain reach. The Task Force proposed broader lan-
guage, based on the Model Act, which sought to cover agencies which
affected citizens through other types of action, such as investigation,
informal action, and negotiation. Moreover, the Task Force proposal
would have permitted judicial review of ultra vires rulemaking or
adjudication by agencies not authorized to engage in such action. But
representatives of the Attorney General urged the narrower language
which appears in the Act. The importance of this limitation remains
to be seen. If there are agencies not covered by the language which in
fact do take action affecting the rights of citizens in ways that could
sensibly be regulated by the Act, the legislature should broaden the
definition of agency to cover them.




The new Act continues the exclusion for state legislative and judi-
cial bodies, with the exclusion extending to units or officers in the "leg-
islative or judicial branches." The Model Act contained a much more
limited exclusion, excluding only "the legislature" and "the courts." 4
Second, the section contains a new exclusion for "the governor, or
the attorney general except to the extent otherwise required by law."
Note this does not exclude the office of the governor or the office of the
attorney general as some state statutes do. i Exclusion of the governor
may be justified on constitutional grounds or because the governor is
directly elected and there may be less need for judicially-enforced
accountability to the legislature.16 The exclusion of the attorney gen-
eral is not as easy to justify. Although that" official also is directly
elected in this state, it is doubtful that his or her work is sufficiently
known to voters to produce an electoral accountability similar to the
governor's.
The clause which says the governor and the attorney general are
excluded "except to the extent otherwise required by law" is thus a
signal to the legislature. When the legislature confers powers on those
officials to take action affecting individuals, the legislature should con-
sider the utility of making those actions subject to the new Act. To
repeat, the underlying principles of the new Act, clarity, consistency,
and simplicity, argue for the widest applicability of the Act and the
smallest number of special exceptions.
A third major change in the new definition of agency is the re-inclu-
sion of institutions of higher education. Those institutions were
included in the original act,' 7 but in 1972 were excluded from the
operation of the act and put instead under a new higher education
administrative procedure act.' 8 There is scant legislative history for
the 1972 change, so it was not clear what-beyond agency prefer-
ence-justified the 1972 exclusion. After extended inquiry into the
matter, the legislature put those institutions back into the general Act,
making special provisions in several places to reflect demonstrated dif-
ferences in the situation of these institutions.' 9
14. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 1-102(1). The Model Act also contained a general
presumption in favor of broad coverage. Id. § 1-301(a). See A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13,
§ 2.2.2.
15. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-2(a) (West Supp. 1984).
16. See the discussion in A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, § 2.2.2(c).
17. 1959 Wash. Laws ch. 234.
18. 1971 Wash. Laws, Ex Sess, Ch. 57 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.19 (1987)).
19. E.g., the definition of rule excepts certain academic rulemaking, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 34.05.010(15)(iv) (Supp. 1988), and adjudications in academic cases do not have all the formal
protections of other adjudications. Id. § 34.05.425(2).
786
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Fourth, section 34.05.030 exempts the state militia from the Act, as
well as the Board of Clemefcy and Pardons. The Department of Cor-
rections and the Intermediate Sentencing Review Board are exempted
with respect to persons over whom they have custody or jurisdiction.
Finally, there are some agency functions that are excluded from some
parts of the Act such as certain proceedings of the Board of Industrial
Appeals, Driver Licensing Proceedings, certain Department of Labor
and Industries matters, and informal proceedings conducted by the
Board of Tax Appeals.20
Where there is doubt about whether a given organization is covered
by the Act, structural solutions may sometimes be apt. For example, if
the organization in question is structurally a county organization, the
Act-which states that it applies only to state organizations-should
apply.21 But modem government is too complex to guarantee simple
structural categories. When one begins to examine community college
districts, transit authorities, boundary review boards, etc., it becomes
clear that state authority, state money, and state appointment of offi-
cials may be involved in governmental institutions that at first glance
seem local.22 In such cases, functional rather than structural solutions
should be preferred. Washington courts-after informing themselves
through the construction rules cited above-should ask whether the
function being performed by the organization is of statewide import,
not whether the acting officials happen to be employed by the state.2 3
Or-assuming again there is no other guidance on the matter-the
court should ask whether inclusion of an organization within the
terms of the Act would provide sensible procedures for that organiza-
tion, not whether the organization is in some metaphysical sense a
"state agency."'24
20. Id. § 34.05.030.
21. Thus, a county board of zoning appeals was held not subject to the old act in Andrew v.
King County, 21 Wash. App. 566, 573, 586 P.2d 509, 514 (1978) and a city housing authority
was held not subject to the act in Riggins v. Hous. Auth., 87 Wash. App. 97, 102, 549 P.2d 480,
483 (1976).
22. See Frohnmeyer, supra note 12, at 423.
23. State v. Board of Valuation, 72 Wash. 2d 66, 70, 431 P.2d 715, 718 (1967).
24. An example of the formal as distinguished from the functional approach is the court's
opinion in Plumbers and Steamfitters Union Local 598 v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys.,
44 Wash. App. 906, 910, 724 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987) which
held that the Washington Public Power Supply System was merely a "local agency" and hence
not subject to the APA.
787
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B. What Is Agency Action?
Agency action is itself separately defined in the new Act The defi-
nition includes agency conduct implementing or enforcing statutes,
adopting or applying rules or orders, licensing, imposing sanctions or
the granting or withholding of benefits.
The Task Force proposal followed the federal act and the Model
Act in including "inaction" within the definition of agency action. 26 It
is obvious that in some circumstances inaction can be a powerful form
of agency behavior and as such should be as subject to judicial review
as conventionally described action. Agencies expressed concerns that
including inaction in the definition of agency action could open the
door to too-frequent judicial review. The legislature's response was
essentially to relocate the concept. Thus, inaction does not appear as
part of the definition of agency action, but inaction remains subject to
judicial review under section 579(4)(b), and inaction in rulemaking is
specifically subjected to legislative scrutiny by sections 630 and 640.
There are a number of specific exclusions from the definition of
agency action, each removing specific functions of particular agencies
from the operation of some parts of the Act. Thus, agency action does
not include certain procurement functions, certain labor dispute deter-
minations, and certain activities in connection with the management
of public lands. Given the values of comprehensive coverage of a gen-
eral act such as this, the justification for all exclusions should be
demonstrated objectively. If any of the excluded functions begin to
impact citizens in ways that would be subject to the Act but for the
exemption, the Act should be amended and the exclusion eliminated.
C. Interpretive and Policy Statements
Included in the definition section are two new devices-interpretive
and policy statements. Interpretive statements 28 are agency state-
ments about the meaning of an agency statute, regulation, judicial
decision, or other provision of law. Policy statements29 are agency
descriptions of its current approach to implementing provisions of law.
As discussed below,3° these tools are part of the Act's general effort to
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.010(3) (Supp. 1988).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1976). MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 1-102(2)(iii) defines agency
action to include "an agency's ...failure to perform, any other duty, function, or activity,
discretionary or otherwise."
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(4)(b) (Supp. 1988).
28. Id. § 34.05.010(8).
29. Id. § 34.05.010(14).
30. See infra notes 65-94 and accompanying text (discussion of "required rulemaking").
Vol. 64:781, 1989
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encourage and empower agencies to give the public reliable advice
about the likely course of agency action.
D. The Definition of Adjudicative Proceeding
American administrative procedure acts commonly provide sepa-
rate procedures for rulemaking and adjudication.31 Efforts to define
and distinguish these two kinds of action have not led to full agree-
ment,32 but the notion that the terms describe basically different
processes is widely accepted.
The new Act continues the practice of the old act in using this dis-
tinction.33 The definitions of rulemaking and adjudication are thus
crucial in determining which procedures are applicable.
To oversimplify the distinction, rulemaking is the making of policy.
It affects people only as members of a class and is typically based on
broad policy objectives, not individual grounds. It resembles what a
legislature does.34 An agency determination that licensees must be 21
years of age is rulemaking. Adjudication is the applying of policy. It
affects individuals on individual grounds and usually is based on spe-
cific facts concerning the affected individual. It resembles what a
court does.35 An agency determination that John Smith is not 21
years old and therefore is not entitled to a license is an adjudication.
The new definition of "adjudicative proceeding" 36 is similar to the
old act's definition of "contested case."37 It includes agency proceed-
ings which determine legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific per-
sons and in which another statute or the constitution requires a
hearing. Also included are certain ratemaking and licensing proceed-
ings. Thus, the new Act continues the practice of the old in not itself
requiring hearings except in the listed ratemaking and licensing pro-
ceedings. Beyond those proceedings, whether a hearing is required
will be determined either by the legislature in authorizing the action in
the first instance, or by a court in ruling that a hearing is required by
the constitution.
31. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.2 (2d ed. 1984).
32. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.4 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp.
1982); Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970).
33. Part IV of the Act prescribes the necessary procedures for adjudication, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 34.05.410-.494 (Supp. 1988), while Part III details the procedures required for
rulemaking, id §§ 34.05.310-.395.
34. K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 7.1.
35. Id. § 7.2; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 4.2.
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.010(1) (Supp. 1988).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.010(3) (1987).
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E. Definition of Rule
The new definition of rule comes largely from the old act. The intent
seemed to be to retain as much of the old language as possible. There
was little legislative or staff discussion of the somewhat different defi-
nition of rule included in the Model Act or of the ambiguities that
language was intended to clarify.
Both the old and the new Act include within the definition of a rule
"any agency order, directive, or regulation of general applicability,"38
while the Model Act includes any agency statement of general applica-
bility.39 The Model Act language was chosen to ensure that all agency
actions with rulemaking effect were characterized as rules.' The lan-
guage was chosen with the recognition that agencies obtain rulemak-
ing effects through a variety of documents which may be called
bulletins, announcements, guides, and manuals.4
Since the Washington Act goes beyond orders and regulations of
general applicability and includes "directives," presumably referring
to anything which is directive in nature, whether labeled a bulletin, an
announcement, or a manual, the new Act can be read as broadly in its
rulemaking definition as the Model Act.4 2
The key to the definition is the requirement in all these acts that
rules are matters of general applicability. As indicated above, it is in
the nature of a rule that it apply to individuals only as members of a
class.43 Thus, to take an example from higher education, a univer-
sity's general criteria for the award of scholarships would be included
within the definition of a rule, but individualized determinations-for
example, the award of particular academic scholarships-would not
be rules.
The inclusion of a matter within the definition of rule, of course,
does not significantly reduce the agency's power to set policy (to
decide, for example, on appropriate scholarship criteria). As will
appear below, including an agency process within the definition of rule
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.010(15) (Supp. 1988).
39. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 1-102(10).
40. Id., comments to § 1-102.
41. A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, § 3.3.1; 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
108 (1965); Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L. REV. 151, 156
(1979).
42. The same language appears in the old act. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.010(2) (1987).
43. The size of the class usually is not relevant. See Anaconda v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d
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requires only that the public be allowed to express its opinion on pro-
posed rules before the agency makes its determination.
The definition enumerates the variety of matters of general applica-
bility in which an agency is required to follow rulemaking procedures.
Those include agency actions which alter hearing procedures, qualifi-
cations for the receipt of benefits, criteria for professional and occupa-
tional licensing, or standards for products or materials. Also included
are agency actions when a violation of an action subjects a person to
penalties or administrative sanctions.
Certain actions which would ordinarily come within these defini-
tions are expressly excluded from the definition of a rule and thus from
the requirement that rulemaking procedures be followed. These
actions include matters of internal agency management which do not
affect the public, interpretive and policy statements as provided for in
section 34.05.230, certain traffic regulations, and a cluster of rules
made by institutions of higher education concerning academic
matters.44
Inevitably, there will be ambiguities concerning the application of
this definition. When there is uncertainty about whether an agency
action is a rule, the uncertainty again should be resolved on functional
grounds, with basic reference to the legislative purpose. The purpose
of rulemaking procedures is to ensure that members of the public can
participate meaningfully in the development of agency policy that
affects them. When the questioned agency action will affect the public
in a general way and where notice to and comment by the affected
public seems useful, the action should be regarded as a rule.45
44. In this list are some rules concerning truly internal academic matters such as academic
credit, and requirements for degrees as well as some rules which have significant impact both
inside and outside the institutions, such as admissions standards. In a better act, the latter would
have been included in the definition of rule and not excepted, but the legislature was persuaded
by the institutions of higher education that such things as admissions standards have primarily
internal impact. The external impacts of admissions standards are significant, however, especially
in a state institution where the cost of education is substantially subsidized. In that setting,
admissions decisions are decisions about which citizens are going to get these subsidies and
which are not. Rules governing such decisions should probably not be insulated from public
comment.
As the main text points out, including admissions standards within the definition of rule does
not cede admissions authority to the outside public. That authority would be retained by the
university. The effect of the definition is merely to permit those affected by admissions standards
to be heard before the university makes its determination. This is a goal of all rulemaking and is
hardly an onerous burden for the institution involved.
45. A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, § 3.3.2(d).
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F Miscellaneous Definitions
While uniformity sometimes is an important goal, there are settings
in which differing agency situations make non-uniformity a more sen-
sible approach. In such cases, variations should be encouraged, and
the new Act often permits agencies to tailor the requirements of the
Act to fit their own situations. When this happens, the goal of clarity
is protected by a requirement that agency variations be made by rule.
This kind of flexibility is expressed in many ways. For example,
most of the time limits set out in the Act may be modified by agency
action. Thus, an agency can frame time limits to fit its situation so
long as the variation is done by rule, and where no prejudice to parties
is involved.46
The Act also provides for conversion of a proceeding from one form
to another when, during a rulemaking or adjudication, an alternative
form of proceeding seems more appropriate.47
Finally, informal procedures are "strongly encouraged."48 It was
the hope of the Task Force and the drafters of the Model Act4 9 that
informality be used wherever possible. Agencies should not be forced
into more elaborate, time consuming, and expensive procedures than
make sense in the situation. Hence, agencies are encouraged to
shorten or modify procedures where possible. Moreover, parties are
given explicit power to waive procedural entitlements, meaning that
increased informality can be obtained with the consent of those
affected.5°
III. ACCESS TO AGENCY RECORDS
The new Act retains the requirement that agency rules be published
and indexed5' and that orders in adjudications, as well as interpretive
and policy statements, be available for public inspection and copy-
ing. 2 Retained as well was the provision that agency orders that had
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.080 (Supp. 1988).
47. Id. § 34.05.070.
48. Id. § 34.05.060.
49. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 1-106 and comment.
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.050 (Supp. 1988).
51. Id. § 34.05.210. The old act treated the matter in WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.050 (1987).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.220(2) (Supp. 1988). The old act treated the matter in WASH.
REV. CODE § 34.04.020(3) (1987).
792
Vol. 64:781, 1989
Washington Administrative Procedure Act
not properly been made available to the public could not be valid
against an individual or invoked by the agency for any purpose. 3.
Public access to agency materials beyond rules and orders is a
broader question outside the scope of this Article. Other statutes in
Washington cover such matters-as so-called freedom of information,
open meetings, and the like.54 But in passing the new Act, the legisla-
ture took the opportunity to clarify some of the relationships between
the Act and existing law dealing with public records. A gubernatorial
veto of one section of the new Act as first passed in 1988 illustrates the
depth of the controversy.
Indexing requirements are important parts of a public records pol-
icy. Despite a statutory command that a wide range of agency mate-
rial be made available for public inspection,5 5 realistic access may be
denied because of the volume of material involved. Few members of
the public will have the stamina to search through filing cabinets full
of materials looking for an agency's treatment of a particular matter.
The Washington public records law included an indexing require-
ment,56 but provided that agencies need not index records where to do
so would be "unduly burdensome.",57 Section 702 of the 1988 bill 8
amended the Public Records Act to make the undue burden option
unavailable to agencies in the case of final opinions in adjudicated
cases and in the case of policy and interpretive statements. Such docu-
ments had to be indexed irrespective of the burden of doing so.
The Governor vetoed section 702, noting that it would "require
agencies ... to maintain indexes that provide identifying information
on these kinds of records, regardless of the cost or significance of the
indexed records."59 Conceding that such indexes would be useful to
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.220(3) (Supp. 1988). The provision does not apply to persons
on whom orders have been properly served or who otherwise have actual knowledge of the order.
The old act treated the matter in WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.020(3) (1987).
54. See, eg., Washington Open Public Meetings Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30 (1987); and
the Washington Public Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.250-340 (1987).
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260 requires disclosure of "all public records," defined to
include "any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government ... regardless
of physical form or characteristics." WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(26) (1987). "Writing" is
further defined to include virtually any recorded data, whatever the medium. Id.
§ 42.17.020(28). Moreover, the policy of the Act requires that it be liberally construed, id.
§ 42.17.010(11), and the courts have done so. Oliver v. Harborview Medical Center, 94 Wash.
2d 559, 566, 618 P.2d 76, 81 (1980).
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260(2) (1987).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260(3) (1987).
58. H.B. 1515, 50th Sess., 1988 Wash. Laws ch. 288.
59. Letter from Governer Booth Gardner to the House of Representatives (March 25, 1989)
(approving H.B. 1515) (copy on file with Washington Law Review).
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the public, 6° the Governor noted that agencies had expressed concern
about the cost and that the legislature was unlikely to provide addi-
tional funds for compliance. The Governor expressed willingness to
"work with the [l]egislature to devise an indexing requirement that
would be both prudent ... and useful.",6 1
A compromise version of the indexing requirement was enacted in
the 1989 technical amendments bill.62 Rather than putting the
"unduly burdensome" exception back in the Act, the amendment nar-
rowed the reach of the indexing requirement itself. The Act now
requires agencies only to index final adjudicated and declaratory
orders "of substantial importance," and interpretive and policy state-
ments.63 While these records must be indexed irrespective of burden,
gone are the requirements that agencies must index such things as
administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect the
public, records containing planning policies and goals, reports of fac-
tual investigations, tests and consultant reports-all of which had to
be indexed under the original public records law-subject, as noted, to
the undue burden exception. 64 The principle behind this drafting
strategy is apparently to extend the indexing requirement only to those
types of records where indexing likely would generate more public
benefits than agency costs. This approach does eliminate uncertainty
about what is an "undue burden," but whether the approach goes too
far in protecting agencies at the expense of realistic public disclosure is
a question that warrants careful legislative monitoring.
IV. RULEMAKING
A. Generally
Development of new policy is one of the primary reasons for the
existence of the administrative process, and rulemaking is the princi-
pal means by which agencies make policy. Procedures to govern this
important process should ensure that rules are technically sound, are
within the agencies' authority, and are politically acceptable.6 These
objectives could be approached by including detailed legislative stan-
dards in granting rulemaking power. Or, they could be furthered by
more intensive judicial scrutiny into the soundness, legality, and
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. H.B. 1358, 51st Sess., 1989 Wash. Laws § 36(4).
63. Id.
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260(2) (1987).
65. A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, at 143-50.
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acceptability of rules. But modem rulemaking procedures are built on
a recognition that detailed legislative specification is not feasible, and
intensive judicial scrutiny is unwise. A major role in achieving the
goals of sound rulemaking must be played by the rulemaking proce-
dures themselves. Technically sound, lawful, and politically respon-
sive rules are more likely if there is ample advance notice of the terms
of proposed rules, full opportunity for comment, if comments must be
fairly considered by the agency proposing the rules, if an adequate
rulemaking record is required to facilitate judicial review, and if suffi-
cient opportunities are built into the system by which legislative and
other community political interests can be expressed.66 In short,
rulemaking procedures are not merely orderly ways of promulgating
rules; they are essential parts of the quality control process.
B. When Must Agencies Use Rulemaking Procedures?
Two separate questions are embraced in this heading. First, when
may an agency which is engaged in rulemaking dispense with the
Act's rulemaking procedures? Second, when (if ever) is an agency
required to engage in rulemaking for the development of agency
policy?
1. Emergency or Temporary Rules
Where an agency is adopting so-called emergency rules, it may dis-
pense with the statutory notice and comment procedures. The federal
Administrative Procedures Act provides that agencies may dispense
with rulemaking procedures in rulemaking where those procedures are
"impracticable, unnecessary or contrary to the public interest."67 The
Model Act followed this lead, with some variation in terms and in the
burden of proof for establishing the existence of the necessary
conditions."
The new Washington Act follows the framework of the old act,69
permitting adoption of a temporary rule without notice and comment
where the agency finds for good cause that immediate adoption of the
rule is necessary for the public health, safety, or welfare. In addition,
66. See comments to Article III of the Model Act, supra note 3.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1982).
68. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 3-108. For discussion of the differences between the Model
and Federal acts, see A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, § 6.8.
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.030 (1987).
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the new Act permits temporary rulemaking where necessitated by fed-
eral funding conditions.7" Such rules become effective on filing7" but
can remain in effect only for 120 days.7 2 A statement of the agency's
reasons for adoption of the rule on an emergency basis must be
included in the order of adoption.73
Because of the importance of the notice and comment process, the
provision should be construed strictly against the agency. Washington
courts have carefully scrutinized agency findings of emergency in the
past74 and, given the rule of construction stated in section 34.05.001 of
the Washington Act,75 it is expected that this attitude will continue.
2. "Required" Rulemaking
When must agencies use rules rather than some other form of pro-
ceeding for policy development? The answer requires a consideration
of how agency policies are made. Rulemaking is the obvious method.
But new policy can also be made in the adjudication of individual
cases. When a new policy is announced in explanation of an individ-
ual decision (in the judicial arena think of the Cardozo opinion in Pal-
sgraf76), and where the decision is followed by later adjudicators,
policy has effectively been made by adjudication. Elaborate networks
of policy may develop and come to exist in a body of opinions in indi-
vidual cases, much like common law.
While there is a place for policy development in the adjudication of
individual cases,7 7 rulemaking is a far superior policymaking method.
In an advanced society where matters to be regulated are complex,
subtle and consequential, and in a democratic society where openness,
inclusiveness and accountability are prized, rulemaking has distinct
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.350 (Supp. 1988).
71. Id. §§ 34.05.350(2), .380(2).
72. The old act provided that temporary rules could only be in effect for 90 days, but renewal
of the rule was possible. The new Act forbids adoption of "identical or substantially similar"
rules in sequence unless conditions have changed or unless the agency has begun a notice and
comment proceeding to make the temporary rules permanent. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 34.05.350(2) (Supp. 1988).
73. Id. § 34.05.350(b).
74. Mauzy v. Gibbs, 44 Wash. App. 625, 723 P.2d 458 (1986).
75. See supra text accompanying note 9.
76. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
77. Policymaking by adjudication is useful, for example, when policies are not fully worked
out or where fact-specific variation is important in the sensible application of a policy, or where
the necessary ex post facto effect of new adjudicative policies is warranted. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
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advantages over adjudication as a policymaking technique.78 A review
of the cited material will show that the advantages of rulemaking over
adjudication include:
-the wider, simpler, and cheaper participation of the public in pol-
icy formulation;
-greater accountability to democratically elected legislators and
governors due to the openness of the process;
-greater public access to and understanding of policies promul-
gated in rule form;
-wide development of policy quickly rather than in a piece-meal
fashion;
-development of policies with more precision, more consistency,
and more uniformity than is likely in the development of policies by
episodic adjudication and;
-application of new policies prospectively, thus avoiding the ex
post facto effect of new policies developed through adjudication.
Given the clear advantages of rules as policymaking instruments,
the question has arisen whether agencies should ever be required to use
rules to develop new policy-whether courts should ever prohibit
agencies from making important policy through adjudication.
Federal courts historically conceded the advantages of rulemaking,
but took the position that an agency's choice of which way to proceed
should be respected by courts and thus that courts ordinarily should
not impose a rulemaking requirement.79 In more recent times, an
78. A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, § 4.2; K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 6.38; B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 4.1-2; Berg, Reexamining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between
Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 163 (1986); Bonfleld, Mandating State
Agency Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 161, 168 (1988); Fuchs, Agency Development of
Policy Through Rulemaking, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 781 (1965); Peck, The Atrophied Rulemaking
Powers of the NLRB, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
The classic judicial statement of the preference for rulemaking is in Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202.
In National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FrC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 915 (1974), the court interpreted the FTC act to empower the agency to act by rule. The
court was in part persuaded that Congress intended to grant rulemaking power to the agency
because of the advantages of rulemaking as an instrument for policymaking.
79. The basic principle was laid down by the Supreme Court in Chenery, which states that the
choice of whether to proceed by rulemaking or by adjudication should lie "primarily in the
informed discretion of the agency." 332 U.S. at 203. While NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969), may have suggested a tougher judicial attitude, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267 (1974) seems to have returned to the Chenery liberality. See R. PIERCE, S.
SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 288-95 (1985) [hereinafter
ADMIN. LAW].'
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occasional requirement for rulemaking 8° or for standards81 has been
laid down by a federal court.
Commentators, too, have urged that in some circumstances agencies
should be compelled to use rulemaking in policy development,8 and
some state courts have explored such a requirement.83 The require-
ment sometimes is regarded as a matter of statutory interpretation,
84
as an incident of the power of judicial review,85 as a condition of due
process, 86 or as an application of the theory that an agency's choice of
procedure should be tested by the arbitrary or capricious standard.87
Sometimes, a state court refuses to permit individual adjudications
by an agency in advance of some particularization of standards in rule
form. Thus, in a Washington case, Worthington v. DSHS, Judge
Doran enjoined the agency from terminating or reducing certain wel-
fare benefits, stating that the standards used by the Department for
these reductions "must be set forth in regulations promulgated in
accordance with the Washington Administrative Procedure Act."
88
In this uncertain judicial area, states have explored statutory clarifi-
cation. Sometimes the approach is merely to require specificity in
80. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354, 361-62 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 476
U.S. 974 (1986). In Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
999 (1982), the court reversed an agency order on the basis that the agency should have
proceeded by rulemaking, and that proceeding by way of adjudication was an abuse of discretion.
The case has been criticized. K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 7.25 (Supp. 1982). Cf Morton v. Ruiz,
415 U.S. 199, 231-36 (1974) (agency action reversed in part because based on policy developed in
adjudication rather than rulemaking).
81. Sierra Club v. Rukelshaus, 61 Admin. L. Rep. 2d 65, 70 (N.D. Calif., Dec. II, 1984).
82. See Bonfield, Mandating State Agency Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 161, 168
(1988). One commentator, stating that a judicial requirement should not be the general rule,
concedes that there may be settings when a judicial requirement of rulemaking would be
appropriate, especially when the agency action abruptly changes prior law, where there is
unfairness in the retroactive effect of an adjudication, where there has been justifiable reliance on
the old policy, and where policymaking through adjudication is unfair to non-parties who cannot
participate in its formulation. K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 7.25. Other commentators believe that
courts will continue to be tempted to require rulemaking but will rarely yield to the temptation
out of respect for agency discretion. ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, at 295.
83. It has been persuasively argued that required rulemaking is more necessary at the state
level than at the federal. Frohnmayer, supra note 12, at 446-48.
84. Medgal v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980). But
cf Trebesch v. Employment Div., 300 Or. 264, 710 P.2d 136 (1985).
85. Concurring opinion in Medgal, 605 P.2d at 287-88.
86. Elizondo v. Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicles Div., 194 Colo. 113, 570 P.2d 518,
522 (1977).
87. Potts v. Bennett, 487 So. 2d 919, 922 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Brookline v. Commissioner
of the Dep't of Envtl Quality Eng'g, 387 Mass. 372, 439 N.E.2d 792 (1982); Bunge Corp. v.
Commissioner of Revenue, 305 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1981). In each of these cases, the agency's
choice of adjudication was upheld as not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion.
88. Worthington v. Sugarman, No. 87-2-00832-8 (Thurston County 1987).
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rules that are adopted, as in the Illinois provision which requires an
agency rule concerning the exercise of a power to contain "standards
by which the agency shall exercise the power."89 Sometimes,the stat-
ute merely only authorizes rulemaking to encapsulate the policy prod-
uct of individual adjudications.9" The recently enacted Utah Act
requires agencies to "enact rules incorporating the principles of law
established by final adjudicative decisions within 90 days after the
decision is announced." 91 An optional provision of the Model Act
encourages rulemaking by "requiring" agencies to adopt "as soon as
feasible and to the extent practicable.., rules to supersede principles
of law or policy ... declared by the agency as the basis for its decisions
in particular cases." 92
The new Washington Act follows the last pattern, encouraging but
not requiring rulemaking. The legislative preference for rulemaking is
clear. Agencies are "encouraged to formalize the general principles
that may evolve from [individual] decisions by adopting the principles
as rules ... ."9' Agencies are further encouraged by section 230(1) "to
convert long-standing interpretive and policy statements into rules."
Section 630(2) specifically authorizes the legislative rules committee to
"review an agency's use of policy statements.., to determine whether
an agency has failed to adopt a rule." Section 640 details the sanctions
which can be imposed for failure to adopt a rule.
Given the clear advantages of rulemaking, it is hoped that agencies
will comply with these clearly expressed legislative preferences. If an
individual agency does not afford the legislative preference adequate
respect, a reviewing court could properly consider that fact in its over-
all judgment about whether the agency action was arbitrary.94 And if
agencies generally do not show adequate respect for the legislative
preference, a legislative requirement such as appears in the Utah Act
would seem indicated.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 1004.02 (1981).
90. "Each agency authorized to exercise discretion in deciding individual cases may formalize
the general policies evolving from its decisions by promulgating the policies as rules .... Wis.
STAT. § 227.11(2)(c) (Supp. 1988.).
91. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46a-3(6) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
92. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 2-104(4).
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.220(4) (Supp. 1988).
94. See infra notes 346-354 and accompanying text.
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C. How Is the Rulemaking Process Initiated?
Agencies are authorized to solicit comments prior to the initiation
of formal rulemaking procedures95 and to appoint consultant commit-
tees to consider possible rulemaking initiatives. 96 Rulemaking can be
initiated by petition of "[a]ny person"9 7 or by agency action. Agency
action will usually take the form of a notice of proposed rulemaking
published in the state register at least 20 days before any hearing."
The new Act is more specific than the old act about the contents of
the notice in an effort to facilitate public participation in rulemaking.
Where the old act required the notice to include only the authority for
the proposal, its terms, and time and manner of public participation,99
the new Act also requires such details as the name of the person pro-
posing the rule, a statement of the reasons for the proposed rule, a
statement of the proposal's anticipated effects, agency comments (if
any) on enforcement or fiscal aspects of the proposed rule, and a
description of how the proposal would change existing law."°
To provide further information to the public about rules and the
status of any ongoing rulemaking proceeding, the Act requires that
agencies designate a "rules coordinator"-a person with knowledge of
rulemaking matters currently being proposed or prepared within the
agency.'0 t The rules coordinator is to respond to public inquiries
about possible or proposed rules and to identify people in the agency
who are working on any pending proposals.
D. The Public Comment Process
As with the notice requirements, the requirements for public partici-
pation are more detailed in the new Act. The old act required that
"interested persons" be given "reasonable opportunity" to comment,
with the opportunity for oral argument limited to cases where the
opportunity was requested by 25 persons. 10 2
The new Act seeks to make participation easier for members of the
public and to ensure that the results of citizen participation are ade-
quately preserved for agency consideration and for any judicial review
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.310(1) (Supp. 1988).
96. Id. § 34.05.310(2).
97. Id. § 34.05.330. For a detailed examination of how federal agencies evaluate petitions for
rulemaking, see Luneborg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking, 1988 Wisc. L. REV. I.
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.320(1) (Supp. 1988).
99. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.025(1)(a) (1987).
100. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.320(1) (Supp. 1988).
101. Id. § 34.05.310(3).
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.025(1)(b) (1987).
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which may occur. The Act makes oral argument available in all
cases, 10 3 provides for a presiding official at the hearing, provides for
stenographic or other recording of the comments received and, where
the head of the agency does not preside, requires that a memorandum
summarizing the comments be prepared for the agency head-a mem-
orandum which becomes a public record."° All of the material
received from outside the agency and prepared within the agency in
the course of the rulemaking proceeding must be included in a
"rulemaking file," with the exception of certain internal preliminary
drafts, opinions, and recommendations. 105 The file will be made avail-
able to the court on judicial review.10 6
E. Agency Deliberation
After the public comment phase, agency consideration of the final
rule begins. As in the old act, the new Act requires only that "the
agency shall consider the written and oral submissions, or any memo-
randum summarizing oral submissions."' 0 7
Several specific matters concerning agency deliberation on a rule
may be noted. It is made explicitly clear that the agency may consider
matters other than material submitted, that "the official rulemaking
file need not be the exclusive basis for agency action on the rule."' 1
This is in keeping with the legislative nature of rulemaking. While a
court usually is limited to the record developed in the proceeding
before it, and agency adjudications are likewise limited, 10 9 a legislature
is free to consider anything that it feels is pertinent, whether or not
any witnesses happened to develop such matters in the legislative hear-
ings. Agencies making rules are treated in this regard as legislative
bodies.
This does not mean, of course, that an agency may disregard the
public comment received. It must "consider" that comment. As dis-
cussed below, this requirement is enforced by requiring the agency to
explain its reasons for the adoption of a rule (in some circumstances,
explaining why it rejected views submitted) and by the requirement
that the rule must be rational.110
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.325(2) (Supp. 1988).
104. Id. § 34.05.325(3).
105. Id. § 34.05.370.
106. See infra notes 240-419 and accompanying text.
107. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.335(2) (Supp. 1988).
108. Id. § 34.05.370(4).
109. See infra notes 125-226 and accompanying text.
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461(4) (Supp. 1988).
Washington Law Review
An agency is specifically authorized to incorporate by reference in
its rules any codes, standards, rules, or regulations adopted by other
federal or government bodies where inclusion of the full text in the
rules would be cumbersome.11 Agencies may not use this provision
to incorporate by reference future changes in the codes or regulations
involved.
Finally, there is a time limit within which agency consideration
must take place. If no rule has been adopted after 180 days since pub-
lication of the last notice, new rulemaking proceedings must be com-
menced. '12 This provision, which is drawn from the Model Act, 1 3 is
intended to ensure that an agency will "not use undue delay between
publication of a notice of a proposed rule adoption and actual adop-
tion of a rule.., as a means of defusing or circumventing widespread
public opposition to its action."' 14
F. Promulgation of the Rule
On promulgation, rules are filed with the code reviser1.5 and are
published and indexed as indicated earlier. 16
When the final version of a rule is "substantially different" from the
rule as originally proposed, the new Act imposes additional require-
ments, which are an elaborated version of the old act's provisions.' 17
The new Act seeks to define what is "substantially different" and then
provides an opportunity for reopening the comment process for any
rules so characterized.' 18
The final rule must be accompanied with a "concise explanatory
statement" which identifies "the agency's reasons for adopting the
rule" and the reasons for any changes between the rule as proposed
and as adopted.1 9 Where there has been opposition to a proposed
rule, the agency, on the timely request of an interested person, also
111. Id. § 34.05.365.
112. Id. § 34.05.335(3).
113. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 3-106(b).
114. Id. § 3-106 comment. For additional discussion, see A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13,
at 230-32.
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.380(i) (Supp. 1988). The section exempts from the filing
requirement certain rules contained in tariffs filed with the Utilities and Transportation
Commission.
116. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.025(2) (1987).
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.340 (Supp. 1988).
119. Id. § 34.05.355(1).
Vol. 64:781, 1989
Washington Administrative Procedure Act
must explain its "principal reasons for overruling the considerations
urged against its adoption." 120
How complete must the explanatory statement be? Must it be the
equivalent of a set of findings that accompany an adjudicated order?
Must it touch all the reasons for and against the rule's adoption?
Must it explain how and why the significant issues were resolved the
way they were? Professor Bonfield seems to suggest an affirmative
answer to these questions,12 1 but there are other views. 122  To the
extent judicial review of a rule will consider the rule's rationality, 123
the explanatory statement certainly must articulate the law and poli-
cies from which that rationality can be deduced and must do so in a
manner comprehensible to the nonexpert judge. While courts have
not been anxious to inquire too directly into the quality of the agency's
reasoning process, 2 the ultimate standard has to do with reasonable-
ness and a large component of that is related to the care with which
the agency treated public comment.
The Model Act wisely included a provision that limited justification
of rules on judicial review to reasons contained in the agency's concise
general statement.125 The purpose of such a restriction is to ensure
that reasons and justifications were part of the agency deliberative pro-
cess and not the post hoc rationalizations of agency lawyers or judges.
It has been settled law since the Supreme Court decided Chenery in
1947126 that an agency action not supported by its contemporaneous
120. Id. § 34.05.355(2). This provision, carried over from section 34.04.025(3) of the old act,
was part of the initial Model Act, but not contained in the 1981 Model Act. For discussion, see
Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedure and
JudicialReview, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 15, 56 (1977) [hereinafter Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking].
121. A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, at 307-15.
122. Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking, supra note 120, at 17; Rago, Rulemaking Under the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act: An Opportunity Missed, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 445
(1982).
123. See infra notes 240-409 and accompanying text.
124. Federal courts generally do not examine the "mental processes" of adjudicative decision
makers. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941). But where there is no
contemporaneous explanation of an agency's adjudication, a court might inquire into the reasons,
sometimes by requiring the agency decisionmaker to appear and testify. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). Whether courts would ever examine the
mental processes of rulemaking action is unknown. Professor Bonfield thinks they might. A.
BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, at 225-30. Professor Auerbach thinks they should not.
Auerbach, Bonfield on State Administrative Rulemaking: A Critique, 71 MINN. L. REV. 543, 555
(1987). See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 7.21; K. DAVIS, supra note 32,
§§ 17:4-17:7 (2d Ed. 1980).
125. "Only the reasons contained in the concise explanatory statement may be used by any
party as justifications for the adoption of the rule in any proceeding in which its validity is at
issue." MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 3-110(b).
126. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). The case makes it:
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statement of reasons should be remanded for agency reconsideration,
rather than become the subject of speculation by those outside the
agency decisional process. 27 Simple respect for the agency process
would seem to require this result, as does an appreciation of the com-
parative levels of expertise of courts and agencies. As the Supreme
Court stated in 1983, "the courts may not accept [agency] counsel's
post hoc rationalizations for agency action .... It is well established
that an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articu-
lated by the agency itself."' 28
The Uniform Law Commissioners adopted the provision without
dissent and it has the support of most commentators.' 29 Unfortu-
nately, such a provision was not proposed for inclusion in the new
Act. It is to be hoped that the legislature will correct this oversight at
an early date and that in the meantime, the omission will not be read
by courts as an invitation to judicial invention. The traditional "Che-
nery remand" should remain the proper remedy when a rule is not
adequately supported by its contemporaneous justification.
G. Effective Date of Rules
The Act provides that rules ordinarily will be effective thirty days
after filing with the code reviser.13' Later effective dates can be pro-
vided in the rule itself, or by statute. As has been indicated, emer-
gency rules are effective on filing. 131
clear that a reviewing court can consider the validity of an agency action only on the basis of
the reasons stated by the agency at the time it takes the action. If those are inadequate or
improper, the reviewing court must remand even if it might affirm the same action based on
a different set of reasons.
ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, at 379.
127. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971); Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,
87 (1943); Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
128. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). It is of course
generally accepted that a court may provide an acceptable theory for a lower judicial decision,
Bode v. State, 91 Wash. 2d 94, 586 P.2d 1173 (1979). It is only where the lower tribunal is
thought to bring something special to the deliberative process-as is the case with juries and
administrative agencies-that the referenced limitation comes into play.
129. Bonfield, Mandating State Agency Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 161, 168
(1988). But see, Frohnmayer, National Trends in Court Review of Agency Action, 3 B.Y.U.J.
PuB. L. 1, 9-12 (1989).
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V. ADJUDICATION
As indicated earlier, rulemaking involves the creation of general pol-
icies while adjudication involves the application of those policies in an
individual case. If an agency engaged in rulemaking functions like a
legislature, an agency engaged in adjudication functions like a court.
Thus, adjudicatory procedures often resemble judicial procedures.
Care must be taken to employ judicial procedures only where they
really contribute to efficient and fair process; over-judicialization of
the administrative process is both costly and counterproductive. '32
Sections 410 through 494 of the new Act describe when adjudica-
tory procedures are required and what those procedures are. The
basic changes in the new legislation relate mostly to the second of
these questions. In its description of what procedures are required, the
new Act provides more detail than did the old and introduces much
needed flexibility.
A. When Adjudication Procedures Are Required
The title covers two different questions: First, what are the circum-
stances which trigger obligatory adjudication, and second, at what
time are those procedures required?
L Circumstances Requiring Adjudication
Four preliminary matters may be noted. First, the Act does not
detail adjudicatory procedures for activities that do not fit within the
definition of adjudication. As discussed earlier, '33 adjudications are
individualized actions determining the legal interests of specific per-
sons.' 34 Second, the Act does not treat adjudicative procedures for the
adjudications exempted by sections 030,'35 and 410.136 Third, the defi-
nition of adjudicative proceeding is limited to cases where a hearing is
required either before or after the interests are determined. Depending
on how the word "hearing" is interpreted,137 this may suggest a fur-
ther narrowing: The Act should not apply to adjudications in which a
hearing would be pointless (such as where there are no facts in dis-
pute) or inappropriate (such as where some form of test or inspection
132. See Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427.
133. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
134. See definition of order in WAsH. REV. CODE § 34.05.010(10) (Supp. 1988).
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.030 (Supp. 1988).
136. Id. § 34.05.410.
137. Some acts specifically define the word. See, eg., Iowa Code 17A (1985).
805
Washington Law Review
would more sensibly resolve disputed facts). Where ambiguity is pres-
ent, the underlying inquiry should be functional: Are the adjudicatory
procedures made available by the Act sensible means for resolving the
issues involved? If so, the Act should apply. Finally, there are places
in the Act where a particular part of the set of adjudicatory proce-
dures is altered for a particular agency or function. 138
Turning to the question of when adjudicatory procedures are
required, there are two basic drafting strategies for an act of this sort.
The question can be answered in the administrative procedure act
itself, as in the new Model Act 139 and administrative procedure acts in
states such as Florida," ° Delaware,' 4 ' Virginia 4 2 and Wisconsin. 4 3
On the other hand, the drafter can leave to other statutes (and the
constitution) the question of whether a hearing is required, as in the
original Model Act and the federal APA.'" In such a case, the
administrative procedure act merely specifies the procedures which
must be followed when a hearing is required by such external
authorities.
The former method usually states the hearing requirement in a gen-
eral phrase,' 4 5 the meaning of which must be construed by courts in
particular cases. Thus, this approach has all the benefits of a case by
case approach (flexibility and sensitivity to elements in each particular
case) and all the costs (unpredictability and decision by nonexperts).
138. For example, independent presiding officers are not required in adjudications involving
institutions of higher education. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.425(2) (Supp. 1988); see the
discussion infra at note 172.
139. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 4-102.
140. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (West Supp. 1982).
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10102(3) (Supp. 1980).
142. VA. CODE § 9-6.14:4(D) (Michie Supp. 1982).
143. Wis. STAT. § 227.42 (Supp. 1988). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has read the
provision to provide hearings even in the absence of constitutional or other legislative command.
Milwaukee Metro. Sewer Dist. v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63, 375 N.W.2d 648, 652 (1985). For
discussion, see Note, Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. DNR: Expanding the Scope
of State Agency Actions Covered by Contested Case Hearings, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 963.
144. The 1961 Revised Model Act provides procedures for hearings otherwise "required by
law." MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (1961). There were, in addition, a small set of
proceedings (mostly involving licensing) where the act did lay down a hearing requirement. Id.
§ 14(c).
The federal APA, section 554(a) provides procedures for "every case of adjudication required
by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for agency hearing." (emphasis
added). Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950), modified, 339 U.S. 908
(1950), added the gloss that the act also could be used where a hearing was required by the
constitution.
145. For example, the Florida act requires a hearing whenever a person's "substantial
interests" are involved. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (West Supp. 1982).
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The latter method permits legislatures to determine, as they confer
particular powers on agencies, whether hearings should be part of the
procedure involved-subject, of course, to any relevant constitutional
requirements. This is more predictable, uses an arguably better deci-
sion maker, and may facilitate better use of informal procedures,
146
but has the usual disadvantages of general treatment, such as possible
inflexibility.
The new Washington Act follows this latter approach. As in the
old act, with one exception, 47 the new Act does not itself mandate
the use of adjudicatory procedures. Instead, it provides that the
agency shall commence an adjudicative proceeding when required by
some external authority. 148 What kinds of external authority can trig-
ger an adjudication requirement? Modification of the definitional lan-
guage has left some confusion about the nature of this authority. In
the old act, adjudications (called "contested cases") were defined to
include proceedings in which a hearing was required by "law" or con-
stitutional right.149 Presumably, the word "law" included agency reg-
ulations,15 ° with the result that hearings not required by the
constitution or by statute but required only by agency regulations were
subject to the Act. The new definition of adjudication applies to pro-
ceedings in which hearings are required by "statute" or constitutional
right. Facially, this suggests that hearings required only by agency
rule are not covered by the Act.
It is not at all clear that this is what the legislature intended. In the
first place, the broader phrase "law or constitutional right" was
retained in section 413 which specifically states the adjudication
requirement.':" Moreover, an adjudication required only by agency
rule would have to be conducted in any event, since an agency must
146. Comment, Experiments in Agency Justice: Informal Adjudicatory Procedures in
Administrative Procedure Acts, 58 WASH. L. REV. 39, 48 (1982).
147. The new Act continues the approach of the old act in requiring the use of adjudicatory
process before contested license applications can be granted, before application for licenses and
rate applications can be denied and before licenses can be revoked, suspended or modified.
WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.422 (Supp. 1988).
148. Id. § 34.05.413(2).
149. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.010(3) (1987).
150. The U.S. Supreme Court has called this the "traditional understanding" and explained
that since "properly promulgated substantive agency regulations have the 'force of law' . . . . it
would.., take a clear showing of contrary legislative intent before the phrase 'authorized by law'
... could be held" not to include such rules. Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
151. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.413(2) (Supp. 1988): "When required by law or




comply with its own rules.1 52 It seems unlikely that the legislature
intended to provide no guidance for such hearings.
Finally, there is no risk that application of the Act to rule-required
hearings would overformalize an agency's own efforts to provide infor-
mal hearings. In general, the Act provides ample opportunity for
informality even in its most formal processes. In particular, it makes
explicit provision for informal adjudications in some kinds of cases.' 53
The Author concludes that the change in the definition of adjudicative
proceeding was an inadvertance and that the retention of the familiar
phrase in section 413 is the surer guide to legislative intent.
The statutory phrase which makes adjudications available when
required "by constitutional right" continues to enable judges, through
rulings on procedural due process, to determine when the Act's adju-
dicatory procedures apply. A discussion of those issues is beyond the
scope of this Article, 5 4 but it should be noted that the courts have
been moving in the same direction as the Act's drafters were in explor-
ing less and less formal ways of providing necessary hearings. Cases
such as Goss "' and Loudermill 56 make it clear that brief and infor-
mal hearings may, in proper circumstances, satisfy due process, and
the provisions of the new Act (discussed below)' 57 on brief adjudica-
tory proceedings seem designed to capture similar efficiencies.
2. At What Time Must Adjudicative Procedures Be Made
Available?
Ordinarily, statutes contemplate and due process requires that adju-
dicatory hearings must be made available before an agency sanction is
imposed. ' The principle gives way in emergency settings, where
agencies need to act summarily, providing fuller hearings later. 59
An emergency situation exists, under the terms of the Act, when
there is "an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare
152. Matter of Benninghoven, 110 Wash. 2d 86, 749 P.2d 1302 (1988); Matter of Ayers, 105
Wash. 2d 161, 713 P.2d 88 (1986); Miotke v. Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984).
153. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.05.482-91 (Supp. 1988) (brief adjudicative proceedings); see
infra notes 231-239 and accompanying text.
154. For recent discussion, see ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, ch. 6; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
31, ch. 5; Comment, supra note 146.
155. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-83 (1975).
156. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
157. See infra notes 231-239 and accompanying text.
158. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-43; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.410(1)(B) (Supp. 1988) exempts "emergency adjudicative
proceedings" from the adjudicatory requirements of the Act, provided they are conducted in
accordance with section 479, discussed below.
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requiring immediate agency action." 1" The agency must give such
notice "as is practicable,""16 and must enter an order explaining its
reasons for taking the action. 62 The order is effective when entered.
The agency must limit its action to what is necessary to prevent or
avoid the danger which justified the emergency proceeding.1 63 After
entering the order, the agency must provide "as quickly as feasible"
whatever hearing would have been required but for the emergency.
64
Of course, the use of emergency process must comply with relevant
constitutional authority.
B. What Procedures Are Required
As with most administrative procedure acts, the statute itself lays
down only minimum standards of procedure, leaving detailed proce-
dural regulation to agency rule. Mindful that one purpose of the new
Act was to bring consistency across agencies where possible, the legis-
lature provided that Model Rules of Procedure were to be formulated
by the Chief Administrative Law Judge.1 65 The Model Rules deal
with all common agency functions and are to be adopted by each
agency so far as is "reasonable under the circumstances"; any varia-
tions by an agency require a finding stating reasons for the variance. 166
1. Prehearing Procedures
Section 434 details the required contents of the notice which begins
an adjudication and provides that notice must precede the hearing by
at least seven days. 167 Pleadings, briefs, and discovery are all provided
for.168 Discovery is made subject to agency rule, but where not incon-
sistent with such rules, the presiding officer is authorized to employ all
the techniques mentioned in Rules 26-36 of the Superior Court Civil
Rules. 169
Prehearing conferences for simplification and settlement are author-
ized, and the Act specifically provides that these can be conducted
160. Id. § 34.05.479(1).
161. Id. § 34.05.479(4).
162. Id. § 34.05.479(3).
163. Id. § 32.05.479(2).
164. Id. § 34.05.479(5).
165. Id. § 34.05.250. Draft model rules were promulgated by the Chief in January 1989 and
later adopted. See MODEL RULES OF PROCEDURE, Wash. St. Reg. 89-10-035.
166. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.250 (Supp. 1988).
167. Ad. § 34.05.434(1). The old act provided a twenty day minimum. WASH. REv. CODE
§ 34.04.090(1) (1987).
168. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.437 (Supp. 1988).
169. Id. §§ 34.05.446(2)-(3).
Washington Law Review
through telephone, television, or other electronic means.1 70 The elec-
tronic conference is specifically conditioned on the absence of preju-
dice to any party.
2. The Process of Proof in Formal Adjudications
The new Act contains more detailed hearing procedures than the
old act. Fairness in adjudications is sought by the continuing require-
ment that presiding officers are either disinterested or fully account-
able. Adjudications must be presided over by either an agency official
with authority to make a final decision-a visible, accountable per-
son-or an administrative law judge from the Office of Administrative
Hearings-a disinterested hearing officer.' A few agencies are
exempted from this requirement and permitted to select organizational
inferiors to serve as presiding officers. The justification apparently is
that such agencies are themselves subject to review by other agencies
or that their hearings present special problems not amenable to the
rules which govern "typical" agencies.172 Finally, section 458 imposes
additional limitations on the selection of presiding officers in an
attempt to eliminate inconsistent functions.
173
Hearings are open to the public unless closure is otherwise author-
ized. 174 At the hearing, a party is entitled to appear in person and to
be advised and represented by counsel.' 75 The new Act makes no sig-
nificant change in the rules of evidence in adjudications, although
there is a provision referring the presiding officer to the Washington
170. Id. § 34.05.431.
171. Id. § 34.05.425(1).
172. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.425(2) (Supp. 1988) exempts those agencies not within the
independent hearing officer system, listed in WASH. REV. CODE § 34.12.020 (1987) to include the
Pollution Control Hearings Board, the Shorelines Hearings Board, the Forest Practices Appeals
Board, the Environmental Hearings Office, the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, the State
Personnel Board, the Higher Education Personnel Board, the Public Employment Relations
Commission, the Personnel Appeals Board, and the Board of Tax Appeals.
To this list of exemptions, section 425(2) of the new act adds institutions of higher education.
The effect is to deny a faculty member, student, or staff member against whom an institution is
conducting proceedings the opportunity of having an "outside" presiding officer for the initial
phase of a hearing. Representatives of the University of Washington proposed the exemption,
fearing-as is detailed infra, note 220-interference with the internal governance systems of the
university. For the reasons suggested, infra note 220, this seems an unwise exclusion and should
be an early candidate for legislative correction.
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.458 (Supp. 1988) prohibits certain investigators, prosecutors,
or advocates (or persons subject to their supervision) from serving as presiding officers. An
agency head, whose only participation in a case has been to make a "probable cause" type
determination, is permitted to serve as a presiding officer unless bias is shown.
174. Id. § 34.05.449(5).
175. Id. § 34.05.428.
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Rules of Evidence "as guidelines for evidentiary rulings" where the
Act itself is silent.176 Parties are entitled to respond, to present evi-
dence ("good" hearsay evidence is explicitly made admissible' 77), and
to conduct such cross examination as is "necessary for full disclosure
of all relevant facts and iSSUes. 178
Official notice may be taken (as in the old act 179) of judicially cogni-
zable facts or technical matters within the agency's expertise.' 80 In
addition, the Act now provides for official notice of codes or standards
adopted by governmental bodies "or by a nationally recognized organ-
ization or association." Parties are entitled to be notified of matters
being officially noticed and to have an opportunity to contest the
matters.
A recording of the hearing is required, and parties are allowed to
make their own additional recordings if that can be done without
distraction."18
As with the prehearing conference mentioned above, adjudicatory
hearings may be conducted by telephone, television, or other elec-
tronic means, subject to the discretion of the presiding officer and in
the absence of prejudice to any party.' 82
3. The Process of Decision in Formal Adjudications
a The Quality of the Decisional Process-Ex Parte
Communications and Separation of Functions
Because one element of a fair hearing is a decision based on a public
record, private communications by presiding officers with persons
inside or outside the agency must be restricted. Nevertheless, an air-
tight insulation of the decisionmaker from outside influence-such as
we use with judges-is not feasible in the administrative agency set-
ting. Some communications from outside the agency are inevitable
and, indeed, are part of the accountability process. Some communica-
tions from those within the agency are essential if the institutional
resources of the agency are to be employed in decisionmaking. Draft-
ers of administrative procedure acts search for the correct balance.
176. Id. § 34.05.452(2).
177. Fetting v. DSHS, 49 Wash. App. 466, 744 P.2d 349 (1987).
178. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.449(2) (Supp. 1988).
179. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.100(4) (1987).
180. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.452(5) (Supp. 1988).
181. Id § 34.05.449(4).
182. Id § 34.05.449(3).
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The new Washington Act contains an expanded set of prohibitions
of ex parte communications. 83 The old act prohibited presiding
officers from consulting persons or parties on facts or law without
notice and opportunity for all parties to be present. Exceptions per-
mitted presiding officers to consult with each other, with personal
assistants, and with others in the agency who had not participated in
the case, who had performed no investigative functions in the case or
who were not prosecutors.184
The new Act contains much the same set of prohibitions, but they
are more specific. Section 455(1) identifies the persons inside the
agency with whom ex parte communications are forbidden. Presiding
officers' 18 5 may not communicate ex parte with persons "employed by
the agency" '86 "regarding any issue in the proceeding"'' 87 except that
members of a multimember decisional body may discuss the case
among themselves, 8 8 and presiding officers can consult with legal
counsel or staff assistants under their supervision. 89 In addition, ex
parte communication is permitted with agency personnel or consul-
tants who have not participated in the case and who are not engaged
in either prosecutive or investigative functions in the case or a factu-
ally related case.' 9 °
Section 455(2) identifies those outside the agency with whom ex
parte communications are forbidden. Presiding officers are forbidden
from communicating ex parte with any person not employed by the
agency if that person has "a direct or indirect interest in the outcome
of the proceeding."'' The general phrase leaves several questions
open, such as the legality of communications between presiding
officers on the one hand and members of the legislature or the execu-
tive branch on the other hand. Such persons may have no pecuniary
183. Id. § 34.05.455.
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.115 (1987).
185. And persons reviewing initial orders. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.464(3) (Supp. 1988).
186. Id. § 34.05.455(1). In context, this includes both employees and consultants of the
agency.
187. The Model Act provision from which this section was drawn carries the following
comment: "This section is not intended to apply to communications made to or by a presiding
officer or staff assistant, regarding noncontroversial matters of procedure and practice, such as
the format of pleadings, number of copies required, or manner of service; such topics are not
regarded as 'issues'. . . ." MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 4-213 comment.
188. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.455(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
189. Id. § 34.05.455(1)(b).
190. Id. § 34.05.455(l)(c). This is a slightly narrower prohibition than in the old act, since
that act prohibited communication with all prosecutory employees, while the new Act prohibits
communication only with prosecutors in the same or a factually related case.
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.455(2) (Supp. 1988).
Vol. 64:781, 1989
Washington Administrative Procedure Act
interest in the proceeding, but very real (and perhaps very persuasive)
political interests in the outcome. This is an example of a direct colli-
sion between the values of political accountability (which would per-
mit the communication) and fairness (which would prohibit the
communication).1 92
Section 455(3) prohibits persons mentioned in the first two subsec-
tions from communicating ex parte with presiding officers. This facili-
tates the enforcement and sanction provisions which follow in the
section. Improper communications and responses to them must be
disclosed, including the identity of the sender, and all parties must be
given the opportunity to rebut. Presiding officers who receive forbid-
den communications can be disqualified, and the portions of the rec-
ord containing the communication sealed. Finally, disciplinary action
against those making improper communications is authorized.
193
b. Manner of Decision
Sections 461 through 467 detail the agency process after the hearing
has concluded. Where the head of the agency presides at a hearing, or
where the presiding officer has authority to make a final decision, an
initial or final order may be issued. In all other cases (as, for example,
where an administrative law judge presided at the hearing) an initial
order will be issued. 19
4
Initial and final orders should be responsive, articulate, and com-
plete. The new Act requires that such orders contain findings and
conclusions and the reasons therefore on all material issues of law,
fact, or discretion presented on the record. Findings as to credibility
must be identified as such. Findings which simply repeat the relevant
statutory formulas must be accompanied by a description of the record
evidence in support of the findings. 195
Findings must be based exclusively on record evidence196 which is
necessary if the hearing is to be fair. The countervailing need to bring
agency technical expertise into the decision of cases is met by several
provisions.
192. See generally ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, § 9.3; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 7.15.
193. WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 34.05.455(4)-(7) (Supp. 1988).
194. Id. § 34.05.461(1).
195. Id. § 34.05.461(3).
196. Id. § 34.05.461(4).
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First, the record can be supplemented by matters officially
noticed. 197 As was indicated earlier, official notice extends to techni-
cal matters within the agencies' specialized knowledge. Second, agen-
cies are expressly permitted (as they were in the old act' 98) to use their
experience, technical competence, or specialized knowledge in evaluat-
ing evidence. 199 This is a very important agency power and is properly
used by experienced agencies to settle fact disputes on slim or ambigu-
ous record evidence. 2°
Of course, the order ultimately must be supported by substantial
evidence. 20 ' The new Act makes clear what was only implicit in the
old act:202 That hearsay evidence alone can be substantial so long as
the parties' opportunity to confront and rebut is not unduly
abridged. a 3
It is important that judges state clearly the basis for reversals or
remands based on inadequate facts. In McDaniels v. DSHSa° for
example, the court of appeals remanded an agency order in part
because of an inadequate factual predicate. The court felt the agency
had not met its burden of proving that the welfare recipient's divorced
husband was in fact living with her. The court said the agency's find-
ings that the former husband was living in the house were based on the
"documentation evidence," (credit card and auto registration
addresses), "double and triple hearsay" (testimony of postman that
some man appeared to be living in the house) and "conjecture." The
court remanded. There is nothing remarkable in the case if it is under-
stood to permit both the introduction and the exclusive use of hearsay
of the type permitted in the Act, "the kind of evidence on which rea-
sonably prudent persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of their
affairs."2 5 The language of the opinion might be stretched to suggest
197. Id.
198. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.100(4) (1987).
199. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461(5) (Supp. 1988). The new Act is slightly less generous
than the old in this respect, permitting the use of agency expertise in evaluation only "where it
bears on the issues presented." Id.
200. For an example of the use of this power under the old act, see Washington Medical
Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d 466, 663 P.2d 457 (1983).
201. See infra notes 342-361 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review of questions
of fact).
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.100(l) (1987).
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461(4) (Supp. 1988). Stated otherwise, Washington here
rejects the "residuum rule" which permits the admission of hearsay evidence but which requires
that there must be a residuum of "legally competent" evidence to support a finding. See B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 7.4 (discussing the residuum rule).
204. 51 Wash. App. 893, 756 P.2d 143 (1988).
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461(4) (Supp. 1988).
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that an order can never be based exclusively on hearsay. That would
be inconsistent with the weight of authority0 6 and plainly at odds
with the new Act which explicitly allows orders to be based on evi-
dence even though the evidence "would be inadmissible in a civil
trial." ' 7 When reversing or remanding on factual grounds, therefore,
judges should carefully explain that the finding is not supported by
substantial evidence and, if further discussion is thought helpful,
explain why the evidence in support of the order is not the "kind of
evidence on which reasonably prudent persons are accustomed to rely
in the conduct of their affairs." Further characterizing discredited evi-
dence as hearsay risks confusion.
As indicated, initial as well as final orders must include findings,
conclusions, and the reasons and basis for the order.208
c. Internal Review
If a decision has been embodied in a final order, disappointed parties
may examine the options for stays20 9 and reconsideration,21 0 and then
may proceed to judicial review. In the case of an initial order, the Act
provides for a system of internal agency review.
Agencies can by rule provide that initial orders become final with-
out further action by the agency,211 so parties must be aware of agency
deadlines for filing exceptions. If so authorized, agencies also can
delegate the power to review initial decisions and render final
orders. 212
In designing a system of internal review, it is critical how much
weight is to be afforded the decision of the person who presided over
the hearing. Requiring that substantial weight be given to the initial
decision is a way of assuring accuracy in fact finding since the initial
decisionmaker spent time with the case and saw the witnesses. On the
other hand, providing that the agency head have a rather free hand in
reviewing initial orders is a way of assuring that legislative policies are
appropriately reflected in agency decisions.
206. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 7.4.
207. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461(4) (Supp. 1988).
208. Id § 34.05.461(3).
209. Id. § 34.05.467.
210. Id § 34.05.470.
211. Id § 34.05.464(1).
212. Id. § 34.05.464(2).
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The Washington Act follows the federal act213 and the Model
Act2 14 in lodging very broad power in the reviewing officer. The Act
provides that the reviewing officer "shall exercise all the decisionmak-
ing power that the reviewing officer would have had . . . had the
reviewing officer presided over the hearing."21 Presumably, this
means that the reviewing officer can freely substitute his or her judg-
ment for that of the presiding officer on all matters of law and policy.
On matters of fact, the same is apparently true, except that the
Washington Act follows case law requiring a reviewing officer to give
appropriate consideration to the administrative law judge's findings on
demeanor evidence.216 The Act provides that the initial order must
identify any findings "based substantially on credibility . . . or
demeanor"2 7 and that in reviewing factual findings of the presiding
officer, the reviewing officer "shall give due regard to the presiding
officer's opportunity to observe the witnesses. "218
This is not a perfect solution. When a party has received a favorable
ruling from an independent administrative law judge, only to have that
determination reversed on appeal to the head of an agency which is
seen as having a strong policy bias-indeed, which may have func-
tioned as prosecutor in the case-a sense of unfairness may be palpa-
ble. But this seems to be the balance most statutes and courts have
struck. It respects the legislative choice that final decision on policy
matters be lodged in the agency, and it respects the hearing rights of
parties by insuring that agency reviewers give some weight to those
elements of the fact finding process that are affected by witness
demeanor and credibility.
The courts, too, can play a "safety net" role here. The ultimate test
of the factual adequacy of an agency order is whether the order is
supported by substantial evidence. The substantiality of the evidence
is to be assessed specifically "in light of the whole record," '219 which
includes transcripts of the agency hearing and the credibility and
demeanor findings of the presiding officer. Agencies which ignore
213. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1982) provides that "on appeal from or review of the initial decision,
the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision."
214. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 4-216(d).
215. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.464(4) (Supp. 1988).
216. In the federal area, the principle was laid down in Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951), cited with approval in Farm Supply Distribs. v. Washington Utils. and Transp.
Comm'n, 8 Wash. App. 448, 506 P.2d 1306 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 83 Wash. 2d 446
(1974).
217. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461(3) (Supp. 1988).
218. Id. § 34.05.464(4).
219. Id. § 34.05.570(3)(e).
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such findings can be corrected by the courts, and the courts have not
shirked their duty to ensure essential fairness.220
There is no right to oral argument on internal review, though agen-
cies are authorized to grant the opportunity. 21 In reviewing an initial
decision, the Act requires the reviewing officer to "personally consider
the whole record" as submitted.222 This is an onerous burden, espe-
cially in complex cases. Fairness compels the requirement, though
practicality largely frustrates its enforcement.223
It is unclear what internal review procedures exist for those agencies
exempted from the obligation of using independent administrative law
judges. An eleventh hour amendment224 refers to those agencies and
seems to describe a separate internal review procedure for them. 2 5
What is not clear is whether the other parts of the Act's internal
220. See, eg., Cinderella Finishing School v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 585-89 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(agency which ignores fact findings of hearing officer violates due process). This analysis should
make it clear how misguided is the expressed fear of the independent administrative law judges-
a concern which was voiced emphatically when the Office of Administrative Hearings was
created in 1981, and voiced again by several agencies while the new APA was being drafted.
Institutions of higher education, for example, obtained an exemption from the obligation to
use independent administrative law judges. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.425(2) (Supp. 1988).
The expressed concerns were two. First, members of the university "family" should not be
forced to use outside decision makers. This was not a weighty concern because the choice always
was left with the individual as to whether the decisionmaker was from inside or outside; the
independent administrative law judge would be required only when the faculty member, student,
or staff member against whom the university was taking action had concerns about the
objectivity of inside fact finders. It is in precisely such a case that other citizens in the state are
entitled to an independent hearing officer and it is not clear why members of the university family
should be regarded with less respect.
Second, it was asserted that an outside decisionmaker might not apply university academic
policy with appropriate sensitivity. But as the main text makes clear, control of policy remains
completely in the hands of the head of the agency - here the president of the university. The
independence of the outside presiding officer only protects the objectivity of the factfinding
process.
It can be hoped that as these matters are better understood, the legislature will correct the
error and provide members of the university family with the rights other citizens have.
221. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.464(6) (Supp. 1988).
222. Id. § 34.05.464(5).
223. The frustration grows from the practical difficulty of exploring the "mental processes" of
an adjudicator as well as from doubts about the appropriateness of the inquiry. In Morgan v.
United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) and Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) the
Court said it was inappropriate to so inquire. And while there have been assertions to the
contrary, the lower courts have been reluctant to press the matter too far. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 17.4; B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 7.21.
224. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461(2) (Supp. 1988).
225. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461(2) provides that in the case of exempted agencies the
presiding officer shall transmit the record to the head of the agency, including comments on
witness demeanor. The head of the agency then shall consider the record and the evidence and
enter an order.
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review process discussed in this section apply to these agencies. Those
provisions contain important guarantees of the quality of the internal
review process, and no reason for exemption from those requirements
is apparent.
4. Informal Adjudications
Perhaps the most innovative part of the new Washington Act is its
approach to the informal administrative process. Even though most
agency adjudications are informal, most administrative procedure acts
do not discuss them: perhaps because procedure acts contain formal
procedures while we tend to define the informal process as the absence
of procedure.
But we have known for some time that elemental fairness is both
necessary and possible in informal process.226 Academicians,227 legis-
lators,228 and courts229 have now and then attempted to prescribe
some minimum standards for informal adjudications.
Accordingly, the new Washington Act, based in part on provisions
of the Model Act,23° provides a new procedure called a "brief adjudi-
cative proceeding. ' ' 231 An agency generally may use such a proceed-
ing when it does not violate another provision of law, when the public
interest does not require participation by those other than the parties,
and when the issues and interests affected do not warrant formal adju-
dicatory process.232 Concern about the quality of informal hearings in
the welfare area led the legislature to prohibit their use in certain wel-
fare proceedings.233
An agency wishing to use brief adjudicative procedures must pro-
vide by rule for classes of cases in which the procedure will be
employed. 234  Administrative law judges can be used, but are not
required; a presiding officer can be selected from within the agency.235
The procedure requires only that the agency inform the party of the
agency's view on the matter, give the party an opportunity to explain
226. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1971) was one of the early reminders of this.
227. E.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 13.22.
228. See the examples collected in Comment, supra note 146, at 44 n.31 (1982).
229. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).
230. In addition to formal adjudications, Article IV of the MODEL ACT provides for three
other types of adjudications: conference, emergency, and summary adjudications.
231. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.05.482-.494 (Supp. 1988).
232. Id. § 34.05.482(1).
233. Id. § 34.05.482(2).
234. Id. § 34.05.482(1)(c).
235. Id. § 34.05.485(1).
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his or her view, and give the party a statement of reasons for the
agency decision. The decision may be reviewed internally at the
instance of the party or the agency. In review on motion of the
agency, action less favorable to the party than the initial action cannot
be taken without giving the party an additional opportunity to express
his or her views on the question. The order on review must be in
writing, must include a brief statement of the reasons for the agency
decision and must be filed within 20 days after the initial order.236
Judicial review of brief adjudicative proceedings will be held on a
record consisting of documents considered or prepared by the agency.
The Act expressly states that this record need not be the exclusive
basis for the agency's decision.237
The future of the informal adjudicative process remains to be seen.
There is great potential for "dejudicializing" the administrative pro-
cess in such proceedings, and several other states have begun similar
experiments.238 It is hoped Washington agencies will make broad use
of the Act's provisions.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Generally239
When the legislature authorizes executive branch officials to act and
that action comes before the judicial branch for review, the intersec-
tion of all three branches of government creates a complex structural
problem. In the overall design, the basic function performed by judi-
cial review is to keep administrative agencies within the bounds set for
them by legislative and constitutional command. During judicial
review, courts support the legislative process by insisting that legisla-
tively prescribed boundaries of agency action are respected. Courts
also may be enforcing any constitutional limits the people have
thought wise to impose on agencies or legislatures.
Agencies benefit from judicial review. Courts can support vigorous
agency action with statutory clarifications. Courts sometimes can
insulate agencies from wrongful pressure from other public or private
actors. In a broader sense, judicial review confers legitimacy on the
236. Id. § 34.05.491.
237. Id. § 34.05.494.
238. They are reviewed in Comment, supra note 146.
239. The following text is about judicial review. There also is legislative review of some
agency rules provided for in the Act. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 34.05.610-.660 (Supp. 1988). These
were not part of the Task Force deliberations and are beyond the scope of this Article.
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administrative process, in essence certifying that agency action is legis-
latively authorized, and hence is democratically accountable. 24
Although Americans repose great trust in their judicial system, 241
there are important limitations on the institution of judicial review.
Some of the limitations are the limitations of legitimacy. It is not the
province of the judge to substitute a judicial view of wise policy for the
view of the agency. While the distinction is difficult to articulate in
statutory terms, and even harder to implement in actual cases, it is
essential that the courts not overstep their proper boundaries. Just as
agencies should be kept within the bounds set by the legislature, so
courts should respect legislative delegations of discretion to agencies.
When a judge is satisfied that agency action comports with the appro-
priate standards laid down in the statutes, in the constitutions, and in
any applicable common law sources, the judicial task is at an end.242
Other limitations on judicial review inhere in the process itself.
Courts are passive, not active, instrumentalities. They are unable to
seek out emerging problems or to investigate possible solutions. More-
over, judicial action is discontinuous---courts deal with matters on an
episodic basis, and they cannot function effectively in a general super-
visory role. Further, courts are staffed with generalists, not people
whom we expect (or even desire) to master the intricate areas of
agency expertise.
Because judicial review remains so broadly important, it is not sur-
prising that statutory judicial review formulas have been centers of
controversy since the first administrative procedure acts were
attempted.243 The polar positions of the debate are clear. At one
extreme is the view that agency action should be subjected to close and
careful scrutiny, with maximum restrictions on agency discretion and
ample opportunities for outside review. At the other extreme is the
argument that agencies best serve the public interest when they are not
subjected to tight restrictions and frequent review, but instead are left
to deal creatively nd flexibly with problems, subject to internal man-
agement control and periodic accountability through legislative and
executive oversight.
240. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320-27 (1965); Stewart,
The Reform of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1988).
241. A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 263-70 (Mayer ed. 1969).
242. ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, at 124-28.
243. James DeLong notes the length and indeterminacy of the debate with the ironic phrase,
"[t]he relationship between courts and agencies has been settled many times." DeLong, New
Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399, 399 (1986).
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In drafting judicial review provisions, the challenge to the drafter is
to find some sensible, useful ground between these poles. One searches
for verbal formulas which liberate agency discretion to the maximum
extent consistent with an honest commitment to the rule of law. One
tries to draft with practicalities in mind, forgetting neither the special
risks of unchecked bureaucratic power nor the institutional limits of
the judicial process. And, finally, one seeks language which has bite,
and which avoids the cosmic generalities that give no one guidance.
A general administrative procedure act should contain several types
of information about judicial review. The statute should identify who
can seek judicial review, when review can be obtained, where it is avail-
able, how one gets it, and what it consists of once it is secured. The
new Act seeks to clarify a number of these questions which were either
not treated in earlier acts or which have become problematical. The
new provisions on judicial review are not expected to eliminate all
questions about judicial review. Rather, the goals are to give all judges
the same statutory starting places when reasoning about review. That
should produce a more consistent and more predictable system of
review. In turn, the reduction in the range of judicial variation may,
in turn, even reduce the quantity of review which is sought.
The old APA provided for judicial review of formal adjudications
and unapplied rules.2" All other judicial review of agency action had
to be obtained through a special writ24 or under the courts' inherent
review authority.246
The rule of construction stated in section 34.05.020247 seems to
overrule the court's opinion in Mue v. Board.248 That case resolved
conflicts between statutes on the principle that a later specific statute
prevails over an earlier, general statute. The new APA, despite its
general nature, will now expressly prevail over even specific later stat-
utes unless those statutes expressly so require.
The new Washington Act states that it is the "exclusive means of
judicial review of agency action," except for cases for money damages
or cases in which other statutes expressly provide otherwise.2 49
244. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.04.070 (rules) and 34.04.130 (orders) (1987).
245. As provided for in WASH. REV. CODE § 7.16 (1987).
246. See Williams v. Seattle School Dist., 97 Wash. 2d 215, 643 P.2d 426 (1982).
247. "No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this
chapter... except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 34.05.020 (Supp. 1988).
248. 97 Wash. 2d 451, 645 P.2d 1086 (1982).
249. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.510 (Supp. 1988).
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Because the new Act provides review for a wide range of agency con-
duct,25 ° and because it provides a wide range of remedies, 5 there
would appear to be little need for special writs2 2 and the "inherent"
review power.2 53
B. How Review Is Obtained
As in the current Act, review generally will occur in Superior
Court254 and, at petitioner's discretion, venue is laid in the county
where the petitioner resides, where affected property is located, or in
Thurston County.255
Review is obtained by filing a petition for review, the contents of
which are detailed in the Act.256 If the agency action complained of is
a rule, review may be had in the form of a declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding in Thurston County.257
Stays can be granted by agencies218 or by courts.259 Where agency
action is based on "public health, safety, or welfare grounds," the
power of courts to grant stays is sharply limited by the new Act. Such
stays cannot be obtained unless the court finds that the applicant is
likely to prevail on the merits and will suffer irreparable harm without
250. See the definition of agency action in WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.010(3) (Supp. 1988)
and the inclusive statement in WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(4) (Supp. 1988).
251. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.574 (Supp. 1988) provides a full range of remedies, including
reversal, remand, money damages, declaratory and injunctive relief both negative and positive.
252. Confirming this, the legislature has excepted action reviewable under the APA from the
statutes granting courts authority to issue writs of mandamus and declaratory judgments. 1989
Wash. Laws, 51st Sess., H.B. 1358 §§ 38, 39.
253. Cf Note, Judicial Review of Welfare Policy Under the Illinois Administrative Review Act,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 199 (narrow range of available remedies in act make exclusivity
undesirable).
254. An earlier draft of the bill provided for review in the court of appeals, a more logical
place for the sort of appellate review that is contemplated in most cases. But the drafters were
persuaded that the court of appeals workload was such that retaining superior court review was
appropriate.
The new Act continues the provisions of the old act which allow the superior court to certify
urgent and important matters for direct review by the court of appeals. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 34.05.518 (Supp. 1988).
255. Id. § 34.05.514. Note that in review of actions involving institutions of higher
education, the action must be filed where that institution is located. Id. § 34.05.514(2).
256. Id. § 34.05.546. The petition must include identification of the agency action, facts to
demonstrate that the petitioner is entitled to relief, reasons for believing relief should be granted,
and a statement of the relief requested.
257. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.538 (Supp. 1988).
258. Id. § 34.05.550(1).
259. Id. § 34.05.550(2).
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a stay, that a stay will not harm other parties, and that the agency's
judgment that immediate enforcement is necessary is not justified.260
C. Who Can Obtain Judicial Review
The old act provided judicial review to "any person aggrieved by a
final decision in a contested case."261 Taken broadly, that standard
would extend judicial review too far: Many persons could be aggrieved
in some sense by agency action, yet be unlikely prospects for vigorous,
well informed judicial review. Moreover, some quantitative limits on
judicial review are necessary if the courts and the agencies are to be
able to function.
For these reasons, courts everywhere have developed a body of
judge-made law limiting the class of persons who can seek judicial
review of agency action. Known as the doctrine of standing, this body
of rules seeks to restrict review to those most immediately affected by
the action. Sometimes, the rules turn on formal matters such as
whether the applicant was a party or whether the applicant's legal
interests have been impaired.262 Sometimes, standing turns more on
functional harm such as where the applicant suffers serious economic
loss by reason of the agency action.263
This judge-made law is voluminous, complex, and confusing. 264 The
new Act makes an effort to reduce both the complexity and the confu-
sion by stating some basic principles in the text of the Act itself. As
indicated above, the expectation is not that this will settle all questions
of standing. Rather, the hope is that with the basic principles stated in
an authoritative place, all judges will have the same textual starting
place. This seems likely to improve both the consistency and predict-
ability of judicial review.
260. Id. § 34.05.550(3). In McKinlay v. DSHS, 51 Wash. App. 491, 497, 754 P.2d 143, 147
(1988), a stay by the trial court was upheld against the objection that it was an abuse of discretion
to stay an order revoking a day care license.
261. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(1) (1987).
262. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 8.15.
263. Davis believes the "injury in fact" principle is the central principle of standing law. K.
DAVIS, supra note 32, § 24.2. For a Washington example, see Reagles v. Simpson, 72 Wash. 2d
577, 585-86, 434 P.2d 559, 564-65 (1967). But injury in fact may not always be enough.
Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. City of DuPont, 27 Wash. App. 163, 167, 617 P.2d 446 (1980), aff'd,
95 Wash. 2d 563, 627 P.2d 956 (1981).
264. "[S]tanding may be the most arcane and bewildering concept in administrative law."
ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, at 142. For a discussion of the volumes of litigation over standing
and the resulting confusion, see K. DAVIS, supra note 32, §§ 24.1, 24.36.
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The standing principles stated in the new Act are not novel; rather,
they come from the better reasoned judicial opinions. Nor do the prin-
ciples turn on formal categories; instead, they are cast in functional
terms. Section 530 imposes three conditions on the availability of judi-
cial review: First, that prejudice or potential prejudice can be shown;
second, that the applicant's interests were among those the agency was
required to consider; and third that the judicial relief asked for would
substantially eliminate the prejudice shown.26 5
It might be thought that the first condition is merely a de minimis
rule: if substantial harm is not threatened, no important social pur-
pose is served by review. But a judicial appraisal of the extent of harm
is not contemplated. The requirement of harm is best thought of as
one rational way to delimit the class of persons who can seek review.
It is rational because it provides review for those close enough to the
agency action to feel its impact in a tangible way and excludes those
who are further removed. Thus, a person should be able to meet this
condition if he or she can show that the potential injury is real, not
that it is substantial. As the United States Supreme Court stated, an
"identifiable trifle" should be sufficient.266 At a later stage in the
review, a court is told to limit relief to those who have proven substan-
tial prejudice from the action. 67 But a substantiality filter at that later
stage in the proceedings presents much different considerations.
The second condition-that the applicant's interests be among those
the agency was required to consider-is the drafter's way of referring
to a set of largely prudential concerns in the law of standing. 268 These
concerns arise from the feeling that not every person who can show an
injury in fact should be permitted to have judicial review. There are
many people potentially affected by agency action in a complex inter-
dependent society. To permit them all to seek review would overbur-
den both the courts and the agencies. Hence, the courts have felt that
a further filter was needed. Called the "zone of interest" test in United
States Supreme Court parlance,269 the test seeks another rational
265. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.530 (Supp. 1988).
266. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689
n.14 (1973) (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613
(1968)) ("regulation imposing increased freight costs would make shipping recycled materials
more expensive and thus would adversely affect the environment in areas student-plaintiffs used;
causation was attentuated but sufficient as long as particular harm to these plaintiffs was
proven").
267. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(1)(d) (Supp. 1988).
268. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645,
670-90 (1973).
269. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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means for limiting review to those for whom it is most appropriate. 270
Here, the focus is on legislative intent. While the Supreme Court has
backed away from a stringent zone of interest analysis,27' the underly-
ing question is whether the legislature intended the agency to consider
the applicant's interests when taking the action it took.27 2
To take a simple example, where an agency is revoking a carrier's
license to engage in a transportation service, it might be thought that
the agency was required to consider the effect of the revocation on
shippers. If so, a shipper would be able to meet this part of the stand-
ing test. On the other hand, the legislature might not have intended
the agency to consider the effect of its revocation on the carrier's credi-
tors. If that was the legislative judgment, those creditors-who clearly
might be affected by the action-could not meet the standing test.2 73
The third condition-that judicial relief will actually help solve the
applicant's problem-is the result of judicial reluctance to issuing
meaningless or ineffective decrees. If the agency action is only one of
several elements which contribute to the applicant's problem, striking
down the agency action may not advance the applicant's interests at
all. In such a case, the court may stay its hand.
For example, suppose an agency issues a tax ruling that denies a tax
exemption for gifts for hospital construction. Should prospective
patients be allowed to challenge the rule? The first two conditions
may be met here because some prejudice is foreseeable and because
one could argue that the agency was supposed to think of the interests
of patients when it issued rules affecting hospitals.
But if a patient were successful and had the rule overturned, would
more hospitals be built? Perhaps, but there are many other actors and
many other decisions that affect the construction of hospitals. A judi-
cial decree in such a case might have no effect.274
270. The U. S. Supreme Court, which originated the zone of interest test, formulated it in
terms of statutes, and the new administration does the same. But it is not yet fully settled
whether the test has some constitutional basis. See, eg., the majority opinion of Justice
O'Connor in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-761, 766 (1984).
271. Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750, 757 (1987).
272. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.530 (Supp. 1988).
273. See L. JAFFE, supra note 241, at 520-28.
274. Cf. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45 (1976) (indigent patients
do not have standing to challenge IRS ruling concerning deductibility of certain gifts for hospital
construction affecting low income persons); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (low
income tenants do not have standing to challenge restrictive zoning ordinance). But see Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978) (neighbors of nuclear facility
do have standing to test the constitutionality of statute limiting tort liability of reactor owner).
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Obviously, sorting out those who should and those who should not
have standing is difficult. The practical reality is that courts are most
likely to examine narrowly drawn challenges to the legality of agency
action at the instance of parties who have suffered injury in a setting
which bespeaks injustice. Similarly, courts are less likely to reach
unfocused, peripheral or fact-dependent questions at the instance of
those whose injuries are slight or whose claim to justice is marginal.
D. When Can Review Be Obtained: Timeliness, Finality and
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The provisions on timing answer three closely related questions.
First, are there time deadlines for seeking review of a final order-the
question of repose. Second, when is agency action ripe for review-
the question of finality. Third, what internal agency procedures must
an applicant complete as a condition of judicial review-the question
of exhaustion, and the related question of what new issues can be
raised for the first time on judicial review.
1. Repose
While the Act provides no general statute of limitations, there are
several specific time limitations within which petitions for review must
be filed. With respect to rules, the new Act carries forward a provision
of the old act and requires that challenges to the procedural validity of
a rule be commenced within two years of the rule's effective date.275
Unless otherwise provided by statute, challenges to the substance of a
rule "may be filed at any time." 276
Petitions to review orders must be filed within thirty days after ser-
vice of the final order.2 77 Petitions to review other matters must be
filed within thirty days of the action complained of unless the peti-
tioner could not reasonably have known of the action or its effect. 278
Petitioners should note that under the new Act, service should be
made on the agency as well as on the Attorney General and the
parties.279
275. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.542(1) (Supp. 1988).
276. Id. § 34.05.542(1).
277. Id. § 34.05.542(2).
278. Id. § 34.05.542(3).
279. Id. § 34.05.542(2).
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2. Finality
Usually, only final agency action should be reviewable. 280 The pol-
icy is to prevent premature judicial review, which interferes with
agency discretion and which can present matters to the court which
are insufficiently developed for effective judicial review. 281 Generally,
in Washington an action is final, whatever its form or however it is
labelled, if it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes a legal rela-
tionship.2 2 The act does not change this settled principle.
3. Exhaustion
Where error has occurred in the course of an administrative pro-
ceeding, it is more efficient for agencies to have the opportunity to
correct it themselves without the need for judicial intervention. More-
over, agency corrections may be quicker, cheaper and more consistent
with legislative policy. Hence, there has grown up a rule of "judicial
administration"2 3 that applicants for judicial review must first
exhaust any remedies available to them within the agency. The
requirement inevitably involves a substantial amount of judicial discre-
tion.2 4  As with the judicially created rules of standing discussed
above, exhaustion rules have grown into a mass of complex doctrine.
The new Act attempts to restate existing exhaustion doctrine28 5 in
clear, statutory terms which should provide the basis for a more con-
sistent and more predictable judicial treatment of the exhaustion
question.
The basic principle is that administrative remedies must be
exhausted.28 6 Three exceptions or qualifications are stated in the
statute.
280. See ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, § 5.7.1.
281. Id.
282. Bock v. State Bd. of Pilotage Comm'rs, 91 Wash. 2d 94, 99-100, 586 P.2d 1173, 1176
(1978) (agency letter stating agency would take no further action in petitioner's case was "final
action").
283. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938).
284. Cerro v. Marshall Metal Prod., 620 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980).
285. Washington's basic exhaustion requirement is stated in Spokane County Fire Protection
Dist. v. Spokane County Boundary Review Bd., 97 Wash. 2d 922, 928, 652 P.2d 1356, 1359
(1982). There are a number of exceptions dealing with the type of issue raised or the effectiveness
of the administrative remedy. Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 457, 693 P.2d 1369, 1378
(1985) (futile remedies need not be exhausted); South Hollywood Citizens Ass'n v. King Co.,
101 Wash. 2d 68, 74, 677 P.2d 114, 118 (1984) (exhaustion waived if issue raised is
constitutional); State v. Tacoma-Pierce County Multiple Listing Serv., 95 Wash. 2d 280, 284, 622
P.2d 1190, 1192 (1980) (exhaustion not required when issue relates to agency's authority).
286. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.534 (Supp. 1988).
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a. Exhaustion Sometimes Excused in Rulemaking
Two kinds of agency procedures specifically are not made conditions
of judicial review of rules. First, following the old act,287 the new Act
permits judicial review of rules even though the applicant has not
asked the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule.288 Second, a
new provision makes it clear that judicial review is available to a per-
son even though the person did not participate in the rulemaking pro-
cess which led to the issuance of the rule.289
But if internal agency remedies are available, they must be
exhausted before a rule can be reviewed. For example, if an agency
creates a special protest proceeding in which affected persons may
challenge the validity of a rule, that administrative remedy must be
exhausted before those persons may seek judicial review of a rule.29 °
Moreover, if the review of the rule occurs in the course of a review
of an adjudicated agency order, the further exhaustion rules concern-
ing orders, discussed below, may become relevant.
b. Exhaustion Excused by Other Statute
The legislature is left free to provide for immediate judicial review
of agency action where it deems that wise.29'
c. General Exceptions to the Exhaustion Requirement
The new Act identifies three general exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement.
The first exception excuses exhaustion when the administrative rem-
edy is "patently inadequate." For example, such inadequacy would
exist if the remedy were not commensurate with the claim. If an
applicant for judicial review seeks immunity from agency action on
constitutional grounds, a requirement of first seeking a discretionary
exemption from the agency would not vindicate the petitioner's
claim. 92
The second exception excuses exhaustion when the remedy is
futile.29 3 A futile remedy exists when the agency lacks power to cure
287. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.070(1) (1987).
288. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.534(1) (Supp. 1988).
289. Id.
290. A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, at 561.
291. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.534(2) (Supp. 1988).
292. A. JAFFE, supra note 240, at 426-27. Cf Lange v. Town of Woodway, 79 Wash. 2d 45,
50, 483 P.2d 116, 119 (1971).
293. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.534(3)(a) (Supp. 1988). The MODEL ACT, supra note 3,
excused exhaustion when remedies were "inadequate." Agencies pressed for the additional
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the problem or when the possibility of the petitioner succeeding in the
agency action is minimal. Of course, many applicants for judicial
review will feel that all internal remedies are futile since the agency
has made up its mind. But speculations about agency predispositions
should not excuse exhaustion; exhaustion should be required unless it
is very clear that the agency would not honestly entertain the claim.29 4
Finally, an applicant for review may not be required to exhaust rem-
edies if "grave" and irreparable harm will result which is "clearly"
disproportionate to the benefits of exhaustion.295 This provision
allows a court to recognize the special (and probably rare) situation
where exhaustion produces few social benefits compared to the indi-
vidual harms it inflicts.
The substantial amount of judicial discretion that is employed in
resolving these issues seems affected in a practical way by several iden-
tifiable factors. For example, exhaustion should not be required in
cases where the agency clearly lacks jurisdiction, where its position
clearly is illegal, where the issue on the merits is a legal issue within
the competence of the court, and where the administrative remedy is
awkward, expensive, or inefficient compared to the judicial remedy
sought. On the other hand, exhaustion is most sensible where factual
issues remain undeveloped, where the agency's policy choice seems of
special importance, when the agency will resolve the controversy satis-
factorily, and where interruption of the agency process seems
unwise.
296
Some of the values which underlie the exhaustion doctrine also sup-
port the rule that parties should be encouraged or required to raise
issues at the earliest possible time in the agency proceedings. The
sooner an agency learns of an issue, the sooner it can take it into
account in its deliberations. This ensures that agency discretion can
qualifier "patently" and the legislature acceded. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.534(3)(a) (Supp.
1988). It is not clear that the qualifier makes any difference in the meaning of the section.
294. In the analagous area of exhaustion of contractual grievance remedies, the Washington
courts have stated a strong bias toward requiring exhaustion which cannot be overcome by a
subjective feeling of plaintiff that remedies are futile. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112
Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989). Though futility has sometimes been held to excuse
exhaustion in Washington, Allingham v. Seattle, 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988); Orion
Corp. v. Washington, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), it has been called a "rarely
applied exception" to the exhaustion requirement. Dils v. Department, 51 Wash. App. 216, 752
P.2d 1357 (1988).
295. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.534(3)(c) (Supp. 1988). The MODEL AcT, supra note 3,
required only irreparable harm disproportionate to benefits. As with the prior section, agencies
insisted on the additional adjectives here, that harm be "grave" and the disproportionality be
"clear." Again, the qualifiers seem to add nothing to the meaning of the statute.
296. K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 26.1.
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be brought to bear on the resolution of the issues, which is presumably
what the legislature intended. It also permits agency disposition of the
matter which may make later judicial review unnecessary.2 97 Despite
these undoubted values, parties should not have to predict, at their
peril, every issue that might become relevant in an agency proceeding
and during the judicial review of the proceeding.298
The Act seeks a sensible balance between these concerns. The gen-
eral principle is stated clearly: "issues not raised before the agency
may not be raised on appeal." 299 Several exceptions are then stated,
all seeking to define circumstances where a person could not reason-
ably have raised the issues at an earlier time. For example, a new issue
is not foreclosed when the person who wishes to raise it could not have
known the facts giving rise to the issue, or when the person was not a
party in the earlier agency proceedings.3" More generally, a new issue
can be raised on judicial review if it arose from agency action (or is
based on changes in controlling law) which occurred after all opportu-
nities for relief have expired, and if "the interests of justice would be
served.,
30 1
The Act then states that when exceptional circumstances do permit
the raising of new issues, the court must remand to the agency for
consideration of the issues.302 This provision underscores the benefits
of agency consideration of important issues before judicial review:
Some of the issues will be resolved satisfactorily on remand, obviating
the need for judicial consideration; others will return to the judicial
forum with the illumination provided by further agency consideration.
The reviewing court then can perform its proper function, which is to
review, not to exercise, discretion.
In addition to this clear notice to advocates about the risks of with-
holding argument during agency proceedings in the hope of a more
favorable judicial decision, the Act also suggests the risks in holding
back any proof. The Act precludes judicial consideration of facts not
297. The basic rule precluding consideration of issues raised for the first time on judicial
review is often stated in Washington cases. E.g., Griffin v. DSHS, 91 Wash. 2d 616, 631, 590
P.2d 816, 825 (1979); Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84
Wash. 2d 271, 274, 525 P.2d 774, 778 (1974).
298. The Washington cases reflect this conflict, sometimes requiring that issues be raised at
the earliest point in the proceeding, Leschi Improvement Council, 84 Wash. 2d at 274, 525 P.2d at
778, and sometimes stating a much more generous principle. Public Employment Relations
Comm'n v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d 832, 839, 664 P.2d 1240, 1244 (1983); Ackerly
Communications v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 905, 908-909, 602 P.2d 1177 (1979).
299. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.554(l) (Supp. 1988).
300. Id. §§ 34.05.554(I)(a), (b) and (c).
301. Id. § 34.05.554(l)(d).
302. Id. § 34.05.554(2).
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contained in the agency record3 03 unless supplemented by new evi-
dence, and it sharply limits the new evidence that can be taken by the
court on review.2
E. Scope of Review
1. Generally
When a case is presented for review in the proper court, at the
instance of a proper party, following the proper procedure, and
presenting proper issues, the court then has to confront the question of
how closely it will scrutinize the agency action. Formulas which
describe the appropriate judicial role at this stage are called "scope of
review formulas."
At the outset, it is helpful to clarify some terminology. Discussions
about scope of review can refer to two different matters.
First is the extent of review: To what issues does the judicial inquiry
extend? An example of a specific legislative restriction on the extent of
review is when a court, in issuing a declaratory judgment on the valid-
ity of a rule, is told to look at some but not all of the potential legal
challenges to a rule.30 5
The second reference is the intensity of review: On an issue properly
within the court's assigned role, to what degree is a court free to sub-
stitute its own views for that of the agency? When a court feels free to
substitute its view for that of the agency, we will speak of a more inten-
sive judicial review. When the court feels it necessary to defer signifi-
cantly to the agency's judgment on the issue being considered, we will
speak of a less intensive judicial review. This way of labelling is less
likely to confuse than the customary labels for review intensity. 06
The process of judicial judgment is too subtle to be imprisoned in
any one phrase or formula,30 7 but two fundamental maxims may be
mentioned at the outset. The court should make judgments about the
extent and intensity of review which (1) are consistent with whatever
303. Id. § 34.05.558.
304. Id. § 34.05.562.
305. See infra notes 379-386 and accompanying text.
306. The labels traditionally used in review formulas are sometimes more confusing than
helpful. For example, terms such as "narrow" or "broad" review leave the reader uncertain
whether the author is referring to the extent or the intensity of review. Terms such as "deep" or
"shallow" seem to be referring to intensity, but one cannot quite be certain. And even where one
is certain the author is referring to intensity, secondary connotations of the labels may conflict, as
where an author uses "broad" and "deep" as apparent synonyms when they can, in some usages,
suggest opposites.
307. Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
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legislative direction appears and (2) make sensible use of the relative
abilities of agencies and courts.
The first principle instructs the court to determine how much dis-
cretion the legislature intended to confer on the agency. Legislative
signals can be general or specific, explicit or implicit. For example, a
certain degree of judicial deference to agencies may be inferred from
the legislative choice to use the administrative process in the first
place. That is, a legislative choice to employ an administrative
agency-with its distinctive legal powers and unique political place-
ment-reflects a certain degree of legislative confidence in agency poli-
cymaking and cautions against a too-intrusive judicial review. At a
more specific level, legislative direction may appear in express statu-
tory3°8 language detailing the appropriate level of review. It is here
that one confronts the limited number of formulas that have been dis-
cussed over the years: de novo, preponderance, substantial evidence,
clearly erroneous, and arbitrary and capricious. While it sometimes is
difficult to distinguish among these formulas, passionate battles have
been fought over the choice among them and courts seem endlessly
fascinated with them.3"9 The drafter must be sensitive to these under-
lying moods and attitudes.
The second principle focuses on the comparative qualifications of
courts and agencies to decide the issue presented. For example, sub-
stantial judicial deference to agency views would seem appropriate
when an agency determination is based heavily on factual matters,
especially factual matters which are complex, technical, and close to
the heart of the agency's expertise. On the other hand, when the issue
being reviewed is a relatively pure legal or constitutional issue, the
qualifications of the court would seem greater, and judicial deference
is less warranted.
As discussed above, the judicial review provisions of the earlier act
treated only review of adjudicated orders3'0 and pre-application
308. In some cases, there is constitutional direction about scope of review. For example, in
the federal law, the doctrines of so-called constitutional or jurisdictional fact may in some areas
produce heightened judicial scrutiny. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3 1, at 624-47.
In the states, heightened scrutiny also may be required by constitutional command. See, e.g.,
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 44, 520 P.2d 29, 40,
112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 816 (1974) (constitutional right to de novo review of some agency
determinations), noted in Comment, The Supreme Court of California 1973-74, 63 CALIF. L.
REV. 11, 27 (1975).
309. Davis estimates 500 pages of federal judicial opinions annually are devoted to scope of
review discussions. K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 29.2.
310. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6) (1987).
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review of rules.3 1' In contrast, the judicial review provisions of the
new Act cover review of all agency action, calling for a more sophisti-
cated treatment of the scope of review.
The new Washington Act provides separate scope language for each
type of proceeding.31 2 Thus, the new Act provides separate scope of
review formulas for review of rules,3 13 review of orders, 3 4 and review
of other agency action.31 5
Finally, by way of introduction, a preliminary subsection provides
that the burden of proof is on the party asserting the invalidity of
agency action,316 that the validity of agency action is to be determined
as of the time the agency action is taken,317 and that reviewing courts
must make a separate ruling on each issue presented to them. 318 This
subsection also contains the rule of the old act 319 that relief cannot be
granted unless the complainant has shown substantial prejudice from
the agency action complained of.
2. Rulemaking
The new Washington Act states a separate standard of review for
judicial review of agency rules.320 Under the old act, rules could be
reveiwed in two ways: before enforcement in a declaratory judgment
proceeding, or as part of the review of an agency order in which the
rule had been applied.321 In the declaratory judgment proceeding, the
extent of review was limited to constitutional issues, statutory author-
ity, and procedural regularity. In the review of an order applying a
311. Id.-§34.04.070.
312. The most discerning approach is a system which details the scope of review for each type
of issue being reviewed. For example, a 1986 American Bar Association study presented a model
scope of review statute which provided separately for the scope of review on issues of fact, law,
and discretion. Section of Admin. Law, American Bar Ass'n, Scope of Review Doctrine:
Restatement and Commentary, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 233 (1986). The Model Act provisions are
similar. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 5-116.
313. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(2)(c) (Supp. 1988).
314. Id. § 34.05.570(3).
315. Id. § 34.05.570(4).
316. Id. § 34.05.570(1)(a).
317. Id. § 34.05.570(1)(b). For discussion of this matter, see A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note
13, at 571-72.
318. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(l)(c) (Supp. 1988). This requirement is in response to
agency concerns about the "shotgun" judicial opinion in which agency action is set aside or
remanded, but in which the precise nature of the difficulty cannot be identified.
319. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6) (1987).
320. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(2) (Supp. 1988).
321. The declaratory judgment procedure was described in WAsH. REV. CODE § 34.04.070
(1987). Authority to review the validity of a rule being applied by an order was implicit in
authority to review the order.
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rule, there was no separate statutory standard for measuring the valid-
ity of a rule. The new Act, as will be seen, provides a single standard
for review of rules, irrespective of the timing of the review.322
As the legislature came to draft the review standard for rules, the
law on the subject was in the process of rapid change.323 Historically,
rules had been reviewed with great deference; rules have been
accorded something of the deference courts pay to enactments of legis-
latures. The classic statement of Justice Brandeis has often been
quoted and its parallel to judicial review of statutes is evident:
"[W]here the regulation is within the scope of the authority legally
delegated, the presumption of the existence of facts justifying its spe-
cific exercise attaches alike to statutes ... and to [rules] of administra-
tive bodies." '324 There is merit in a substantial degree of judicial
deference to agency rules. When a legislature has granted broad
rulemaking authority to an agency, it has necessarily conferred sub-
stantial discretion on that agency. The legislative choice to confer dis-
cretion must be respected by the courts.
Deference has its limits, however. When modem rulemaking began
to impact large segments of the population-in fields such as con-
sumer protection, workplace safety, and the environment-and when
the fiscal, ecological and other consequences of inappropriate rules
began to be appreciated, judges began to rethink their traditional
reluctance to inquire into agency rules. Because intensive inquiry was
not thought appropriate for judges, judicial probes in this direction
were halting, uneven, and sometimes cloaked as procedural inquiries,
asserting that the agency product was not adequately explained or that
the record was in some sense incomplete.325 The Supreme Court has
attempted to keep this movement within some bounds,3 26 but with
only limited success.327
322. See infra notes 329-336 and accompanying text.
323. K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 29.1; ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, 393-400.
324. Pacific States Box and Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935).
325. For a general discussion, see K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 6.36. The best illustration of
this phenomenon, played out as a conflict between the D.C. Circuit-seeking deeper judicial
review of agency procedures-and the U.S. Supreme Court-seeking to keep judges within more
traditional bounds-is seen in the Vermont Yankee litigation. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 547 F.2d 633 (DC. Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
326. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
327. For discussion of the difficulty of arresting the development of this new judicial
assertiveness, see K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 6.37; Symposium, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Three Perspectives, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1804
(1978).
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The drafters of the Model Act were well aware of the rapid move-
ment in this doctrine and provide a much more intensive scope of
review than the orthodox Pacific States Box and Basket deference.
The Model Act provides that beyond the usual constitutional, statu-
tory and procedural issues (which always had been reviewable), courts
could also inquire into the adequacy of the factual basis of a rule, using
the substantial evidence test. 28 Further, courts could inquire into the
reasonableness of a rule under either an "outside the range of discre-
tion" formula329 or an optional "arbitrary and capricious" test.330
In drafting the new Washington Act, some increased intensity in the
review of agency rules seemed appropriate given the current move-
ments in judicial doctrine, but some felt the arbitrary and capricious
test stated too intensive a standard. After considerable discussion, the
legislature provided that courts can examine a rule to see if it could
"conceivably have been the product of a rational decision maker. "331
It remains to be seen if this subtle drafting effort really states a
formula that a judge can distinguish from the arbitrary and capricious
standard. However it is phrased, it is clear is that limited judicial
review was intended. The cautions noted below in connection with the
use of the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing orders332 are
cautions which should apply with special force in reviewing rules.
This standard now applies to review of rules in advance of applica-
tion as well as review of rules which have been applied in an agency
adjudication. When review of a rule is undertaken in the course of
reviewing an adjudicated order, there may be twoseparate inquiries:
Whether the underlying rule is valid, and whether the application of
the rule in this case is valid. Where rationality is a part of both inquir-
ies, the statute seems to state different standards: The "product of a
rational decisionmaker" test for rules and the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" test for applications. Again, only judges can tell us whether
these tests have different operational meaning.
328. MODEL ACT § 5-117(c)(7).
329. Id. § 5-116(c)(8)(i).
330. Id. § 5-116(c)(8)(iv).
331. WAsH. REv. CODE § 34.05.570(2)(c) (Supp. 1988).
332. See infra notes 366-375 and accompanying text.
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3. Orders
Section 34.05.570(3) details the scope of review of agency orders.333
The section states a number of separate grounds for invalidity. Con-
ceding the risks of paraphrase, it may be helpful to see the list in a
general way. Under the section an order is invalid if it is:
(a) in violation of the constitution,
(b) outside the agency's authority,
(c) the product of invalid procedure,
(d) based on erroneous interpretation or application of law,
(e) unsupported by substantial evidence,
(f) incomplete (i.e., required issues are unresolved),
(g) the product of a biased tribunal,
(h) inconsistent with an agency rule, or
(i) arbitrary or capricious.
a. Reviewing Law and Policy
The extent of review under the first four sections is clear. The court
may look to any relevant legal standards to determine the legality of
the agency action, including constitutional provisions, authorizing
statutes, other statutes, and agency rules. The inquiry can extend to
the legality of the order itself, to the constitutionality of the statute on
which the order rests, or to the legality of the agency rule to which it
applies.
The question about the intensity of judicial review of these items is
more complex. One begins with the supposition that in reviewing
questions such as these-questions which might be characterized as
questions of law-review will be relatively intense. On the compara-
tive qualifications principle discussed above, the courts, not the agen-
cies, are the experts on legal questions. This suggests that courts
should be fairly free to substitute their judgments for those made by
the agency.
But the other principle mentioned above requires us to consider the
probable intent of the legislature about the degree of intensity which
courts should use in reviewing agency determinations of law. Now
and then it is possible to find, express or implied, a judgment of the
legislature that the agency's discretion in working with the statute
should be given some special weight. For example, item (d) in the list
authorizes a court to reverse for an error in the application of law. If
333. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(3) (Supp. 1988).
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the agency were authorized to apply a broad statutory term to a spe-
cific set of facts, one might infer that the legislature expected some
benefit of insight or judgment from the agency's initial determination.
If so, some judicial deference would seem appropriate. The federal
cases have not produced a single rule, but there is old and solid
authority, 334 as well as current decisions, 335 that permit or even
require courts to defer to agencies on such questions.
In Washington, the court has stated the proposition that an
agency's interpretation of its own statute is entitled to "substantial
weight, 3 3 6  "great deference, ' 337  or "great weight., 338  And an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations has been similarly
respected by the Washington courts. 339 At the same time, other cases
hold that in reviewing an agency's application of a statutory term to a
specific set of facts, the court has an "inherent and statutory authority
to make a de novo review independent of the [agency's] decision. ' 3 °
Of course, these formulas are highly elastic; courts can move up or
down the intensity scale to a considerable degree without violating
such general guides. Judicial deference on questions seen as questions
of law is most appropriate when the determination is inextricably
bound up with factual issues and most especially when those factual
issues are technical, complex, or specialized and are within the pre-
sumed expertise of the agency. General judicial deference beyond this
area would not seem warranted, but legislative intent is again the key.
334. The classic authority is NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. fl1l (1944) where
the Court stated:
[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a
proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the
reviewing court's function is limited. [The agency's] determination... is to be accepted if it
has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law.
322 U.S. AT 131.
The comments to MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 5-116, reflect the same view.
335. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
336. Overton v. Economic Assistance Auth., 96 Wash. 2d 552, 555, 637 P.2d 652, 654 (1981).
337. International Assoc. of Firefighters Local No. 469 v. Public Employment Relations
Comm'n, 38 Wash. App. 572, 575, 686 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1984); San Juan County v. Department
of Natural Resources, 28 Wash. App. 796, 799, 626 P.2d 995, 997 (1981).
338. Prescott Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 30 Wash. App. 413, 417, 634
P.2d 897, 900 (1981).
339. Washington State Liquor Control Bd. v. Washington State Personnel Bd., 88 Wash. 2d
368, 379, 561 P.2d 195, 201 (1977); Vliet v. Department of Labor & Indus., 30 Wash. App. 709,
713, 638 P.2d 112, 115 (1981).
340. Weyerhauser Co. v. Department of Revenue, 16 Wash. App. 112, 115, 553 P.2d 1349,
1351 (1976); see also Marquardt v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co., 33 Wash. App. 685, 690, 658 P.2d




b. The Substantial Evidence Test: Testing the Factual Adequacy of
Agency Action
In review of record proceedings, the factual adequacy of the agency
order is tested under the substantial evidence test. That test has the
advantage of familiarity, 341 and it was the test originally used in the
first Washington Administrative Procedure Act.342 In 1972, it was
replaced with the "clearly erroneous" test.343 The Washington courts
seem to have been unclear about the purpose of the change, and
whether it was intended to make review of agency fact findings more
or less intensive. 3 " Considering the normal usages of the terms in
other contexts, it is arguable that clear error is a more intensive test
than the substantial evidence test.345 This suggests that the legislature
intended by the present change to reduce the intensity of judicial
review of agency factfinding. The possibility seems remote, however,
that a reviewing judge will be able to identify a significant operational
difference between the two standards.346 Both are middle-level tests,
more intensive than "scintillia" or "no basis in fact" tests and less
intensive than de novo or other fully substitutional tests. In any event,
in the new Act, the legislature has returned to the more widely used
and better understood substantial evidence test.
The substantial evidence test sometimes is described as an inquiry
into the reasonableness of the evidentiary support for the order.347
Perhaps more accurately, it is a test of the quality of the reasoning
process which connects the evidence with the agency finding: Evidence
is substantial when the court concludes that the agency, by reasoning,
could have moved from the evidence in the record to the findings.
348
Whether the findings are reasonable in any other sense would not seem
341. The substantial evidence test is the usual test for reviewing jury verdicts, B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 31, § 10.11, and is the standard for reviewing the factual adquacy of adjudicated
orders under the federal administrative procedure act. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(E).
342. 1959 Wash. Laws ch. 234, § 13(6)(e).
343. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e) (1987).
344. The early response of the Washington courts to the 1972 amendments is treated in
Andersen, Judicial Review of Agency Fact-Finding in Washington: A Brief Comment, 13
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 397 (1977).
345. Id.
346. Professor Cooper, a draftsman of the 1961 Model APA, did a comparative study of the
two tests and concluded that "many judges find it most difficult to distinguish between the
'substantial evidence' and 'clear error' tests." Cooper, Administrative Law: The 'Substantial
Evidence' Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945, 947 (1958).
347. The basic judicial statement is Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1951). See ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, § 7.3.1; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 10.7.
348. L. JAFFE, supra note 241, at 598.
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relevant. And of course, whether the court would have made the same
findings from the evidence is equally irrelevant.
These considerations make it clear that the substantial evidence test
in its pure form should apply only to review of agency factual determi-
nations349 and then, only to factual determinations that are made on
some kind of record.350
Moreover, under the new Act the substantial evidence test applies
only to adjudications-where some record is produced-and is not
used to review the factual adequacy of rules. If the validity of a rule is
questioned in the review of an adjudicative proceeding, the factual
foundation for the rule is tested by the more general "product of a
rational decision maker" test.35 Whether the tests are distinguishable
is, of course, debatable, but the legislature presumably intended some
difference in the different formulations. Based on the preceding dis-
cussion of the legislative nature of rulemaking,352 one would suppose
that judicial review of the factual adequacy of a rule would be less
intensive than judicial review of the factual adequacy of an order.
The record to which a court looks for substantial evidence is the
record defined in the Act, plus any supplementary material which is
permitted. The type of proceeding involved determines the degree to
which a record can be supplemented on review. In the case of formal
adjudications, the record presented by the agency to the court on
review can be supplemented only as to matters bearing on procedure
or on the disqualification of the agency. 353 On review of informal pro-
ceedings, such as brief adjudications and rulemaking, the record on
review can be supplemented by "[m]aterial facts" as needed.354
The substantiality of the evidence is to be judged, as it was under
the old act,355 on the basis of the record as a whole. This means that
the judicial function is not completed when the court finds in the rec-
ord some evidence it regards as substantial. The court instead must
349. It is confusing to equate tests of evidentiary adequacy with tests of general
reasonableness of the agency order. Thus, courts should avoid the conclusion that inadequacy of
evidentiary support renders an order "arbitrary or capricious." Cf Stempel v. Department of
Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 114, 508 P.2d 166, 169 (1973).
350. This does not mean that the substantial evidence test is used only when the agency has
engaged in a formal adjudication. The record referred to is defined in the Act and includes the
record in informal proceedings as well. See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
351. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(2)(c) (Supp. 1988).
352. See supra notes 321-333 and accompanying text.
353. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.562 (Supp. 1988).
354. Id. § 34.05.562(1)(c).
355. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e) (1987).
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look at the entire record submitted and make its judgment about sub-
stantiality after it has considered any evidence that "fairly detracts"
from the evidence supporting the order.356 As was indicated earlier, 357
hearsay evidence can be admitted.35 8 The statute makes clear, too,
that hearsay alone can be substantial evidence, so long as it is "the
kind of evidence on which reasonably prudent persons are accustomed
to rely" and if the use of such evidence does not "unduly abridge the
parties' opportunities to confront witnesses and rebut evidence." '359
This indicates that the legislature has specifically rejected the so-called
"residuum rule.",360
c. Requiring Consistency in Agency Action
As discussed earlier,3 61 the new Act seeks reliability and predictabil-
ity in agency decisions. This purpose is furthered by the provision that
agency orders ordinarily must be consistent with agency rules.362 The
Act provides that an order inconsistent with an agency rule can be set
aside unless the agency demonstrates a rational basis for the
inconsistency.
For purposes of clarity, it would have been preferable if the Act also
codified the principle asserted in some Washington cases requiring
that orders also be consistent with agency practice unless the inconsis-
tency is explained.36 3 A provision to this effect was proposed in the
Model Act,364 and a version was included in the Task Force proposal.
The legislature apparently was persuaded, however, that the proposed
standard was unnecssary-either because the doctrine was already
established in case law, or because unexplained variations from agency
practice could be reached under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
356. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
357. See supra notes 177, 202-208 and accompanying text.
358. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.452(1) (Supp. 1988).
359. Id. § 34.05.461(4).
360. K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 16.6.
361. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussion of interpretive and policy
statements).
362. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(3)(h) (Supp. 1988).
363. See Vergeyle v. Department of Employment Sec., 28 Wash. App. 399, 404, 623 P.2d 736,
739 (1981). The rule is settled at the federal level as well. See Baton Rouge Marine Contractors,
Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 655 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
364. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 5-116(c)(8)(iii).
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d. Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action
The final item in the new Act's list of grounds for invalidity of
agency action is the arbitrary and capricious test.365 The test is as old
as judicial review of government action and is intended to authorize
courts to set aside administrative action wholly lacking in rationality.
It is difficult to elaborate the concept beyond the natural meaning of
the words used in its formulation, and the endless judicial glosses and
applications do not add much.
A couple of general observations about its use may be helpful, how-
ever. First, the test is the proper test to use when reviewing exercises
of agency discretion.366 That means it bears close resemblance to the
"abuse of discretion" test. 367  It would serve analytical clarity to
reserve the test for reviewing exercises of discretion and not use it in
reviewing agency determination of law or fact. Second, on the inten-
sity of review spectrum, the test occupies a band closer to the least
intensive end. That is, it usually does not authorize judges to freely
substitute their preferences or policy conclusions for that of the
agency. We do deal, however with a band on the intensity scale, not a
point. And within that band, there is room for a court to describe the
arbitrary and capricious test as requiring a "thorough, probing, in
depth review' 36' and to engage in what has become known as "hard
look" review-clearly a few steps up the intensity scale.369 In most
situations, however, a less intensive version of the test seems most con-
sistent with judicial practice and with legislative preference that dis-
cretion be exercised by agencies rather than by courts.37°
Whatever smooth formulations may appear in learned journals or
judicial opinions, the real world application of the arbitrary and capri-
cious test cannot be easy. It requires a judge with sensitivity to the
365. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.570(3) (Supp. 1988).
366. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
367. The two are often coupled, as in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (2)(A) (1982), and in section 15(g)(6) of the original (1961) Model Act.
368. Overton Park; 401 U.S. at 415.
369. ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, § 7.5.2.
370. As Professor Bonfield has put it:
[I]t is clear that the words... 'arbitrary or capricious' are not intended to vest authority in
the courts to substitute their judgments for those of the agencies with respect to the wisdom
or desirability of [agency action]. Instead, this language intends only to authorize the courts
to set aside [agency action if it is] so clearly outside the range of action expected from
responsible decision makers that [it] cannot be successfully defended as an exercise of
reasoned judgment. That is, this language ... is intended to authorize judicial invalidation
of agency action only if the agency took such action wholly on the basis of whim or illogical
thinking. In short, the agency must have acted irrationally.
A. BONFIELD, SAR, supra note 13, at 575.
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values of agency policymaking, with commitment to reasoned govern-
ment action, and with the wisdom to tell when one of these important
values has unacceptably encroached upon the other.
The arbitrary and capricious test was included in the original Wash-
ington Act, 37' and the Washington courts have tended to assign it the
conventional, low-intensity meaning being herein described.3 72 The
provision was included in the new Act, presumably on the assumption
that the prevailing consensus about its intensity would continue.
Finally, one special aspect of the arbitrary and capricious test war-
rants mention-the propriety of using the test to inquire into the adju-
dicator's motive or purpose. The Model Act and the original Task
Force proposal included a separate reference to "improper purpose"
as a grounds for reversal of agency orders. 373 The Task Force propo-
sal was supported by several Washington cases that made the integrity
of the adjudicator an issue in determining arbitrariness. 374 As enacted,
the Act does not contain this separate provision. Presumably, the
prior Washington case law continues and the motive of the adjudicator
can be examined as part of the court's general inquiry into the arbi-
trariness of the order.
4. Reviewing Agency Action Beyond Rules and Orders
The final part of the scope of review section deals with agency
action that is neither a rule nor an order. As has been indicated, the
old Washington act provided judicial review only for formal adjudica-
tions 37 5 and unapplied rules,3 76 and did not address scope of review
issues for other forms of agency action. Because the new Act applies
to a broader range of action,377 scope of review formulas for these
forms are included in this section.
371. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(f) (1987).
372. Pierce County Sheriff v. Civil Serv. Comm'n for Sheriff's Employees, 98 Wash. 2d 690,
695, 658 P.2d 648, 651 (1983) ("heavy burden" on one challenging agency action under this test);
Public Employee Relations Comm'n v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d 832, 841-42, 664 P.2d
1240, 1245 (1983) (arbitrary and capricious review labelled "limited" review in which court is to
give "great deference" to agency fact findings and expertise); Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State,
93 Wash. 2d 465, 474-75, 611 P.2d 396, 402 (1980) (court not to substitute its views for those of
agency).
373. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 5-116(c)(6).
374. E.g., Equitable Shipyards, 93 Wash. 2d at 474-75, 611 P.2d at 402; Jow Sin Quan v.
Washington State Liquor Conrol Bd., 69 Wash. 2d 373, 378-79, 418 P.2d 424, 427-28 (1966).
375. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(1) (1987).
376, Id. § 34.04.070.
377. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (definition of "agency action").
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a. The Extent of Review
The extent of review is carefully spelled out. The additional forms
of agency action covered include all agency conduct within the Act's
definition of agency action which is not in the form of a rule or
order-i.e., agency conduct which involves such things as the "imple-
mentation or enforcement of a statute" or the "imposition of sanc-
tions, or the granting or withholding of benefits." '378 As discussed
below, this section specifically provides for judicial review of agency
inaction in certain circumstances.379
In reviewing this type of agency action, the court may look at ques-
tions of (i) constitutionality, (ii) statutory authority, (iii) whether the
action was arbitrary or capricious, or (iv) whether the agency itself
was properly constituted.38 ° It is instructive to compare this list with
the provisions describing the extent of review of rules and orders. The
review provided in this section is very much like the scope stated for
review of rules, where the court also can examine the constitutional
and statutory authority supporting the action, as well as make some
inquiry into its rationality.38' On the other hand, questions that can
be examined in review of orders that are not listed in this section
include the legality of procedures followed,38 the adequacy of the fac-
tual support for the action,383 the completeness of the action,3 84 and its
consistency with agency rules.38 5 Since these criteria are employed in
the review of orders, and thus are given a kind of legitimacy, it seems
likely that serious shortfalls in any of these areas can be reached under
the section's arbitrary and capricious standard.
b. The Intensity of Review
The intensity of review will depend on the type of issue that is
presented for review. Presumably, review of items (i), (ii) and (iv) in
the above enumeration will receive relatively intensive review, reflect-
ing the comparative qualifications of courts and agencies on such ques-
tions. In contrast, the intensity of review of questions of arbitrariness
should receive less intensive review for the reasons discussed earlier.
378. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.010(3) (1987).
379. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(4)(b) (Supp. 1988).
380. Id. § 34.05.570(4)(c).
381. Id. § 34.05.570(2)(c).
382. Id. § 34.05.570(3)(c).
383. Id. § 34.05.570(3)(e).
384. Id. § 34.05.570(3)(f).
385. Id. § 34.05.570(3)(h).
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c. Review of Agency Inaction
Because inaction can be a powerful form of agency action in some
circumstances, judicial review of inaction serves the conventional pur-
poses of protecting citizens and keeping agencies within legislatively
prescribed bounds.38 6 At the same time, inappropriate judicial second
guessing of some kinds of agency decisions not to act would be unwise;
prosecutorial discretion, for example, does not seem a suitable subject
for intensive judicial supervision.
Statutory and judicial treatment of the problem of reviewing inac-
tion work within this conflict in values. The federal act covers inac-
tion generally, but excepts from judicial review matters "committed to
agency discretion, ' 387 an exception of uncertain scope.3 88 Some states
specifically provide for review of "failure or refusal of an agency to
act." The Model Act included inaction within its definition of agency
action, making it always subject to review,389 the drafters believing
that frivolous or too-intrusive review were better dealt with by scope
of review provisions than with preliminary definitions.39 ° The original
Task Force proposals were patterned on the Model Act approach.
Agencies expressed concern that explicit inclusion of inaction
within the definition of agency action would invite too frequent and
too intrusive review. In response to such concerns, the legislature left
inaction out of the definition of agency action. Nevertheless, much
agency inaction remains subject to judicial review under the new Act.
This section provides that a person whose rights are violated "by an
agency's failure to perform a duty that is required by law to be per-
formed" is entitled to judicial review.39  And the section describing
the types of relief available specifically authorizes a court to "order an
agency to take action required by law.",392
Other sections of the Act also make it clear that the presence of
agency discretion does not deprive the court of power to review agency
inaction. Section 580 authorizes judicial inquiry into the arbitrariness
of an agency's failure to act. 3 9 3 Section 574 specifically authorizes a
386. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Cheney, 52 U. CI. L. REV. 653,
656 (1985).
387. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). For a discussion of review of inaction in the federal arena,
see Note, Administrative Agency Inaction: Misapplication of the Finality Doctrine-Sierra Club v.
Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983), 59 WASH. L. REV. 993 (1984).
388. ADMIN. LAW, supra note 79, § 5.3.1.
389. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 11006.1(A) (1989).
390. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 1-102 comments.
391. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(4)(b) (Supp. 1988).
392. Id. § 34.05.574.
393. Id. § 34.05.570(4)(c)(iii).
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court to compel an agency to exercise its discretion.394 And section
582 provides that a court can inquire into the arbitrariness of an
agency's refusal to enforce an order.395
It would seem that in these various sections dealing with review of
inaction, the legislature sought to eliminate the formal, narrow and
complex proceedings associated with the prerogative writs, and to put
in their place a simple, clear way to test the legality of agency conduct,
whether the injury caused by that conduct resulted from action or
inaction.
. Turning to the intensity with which courts are to review agency
inaction, the intensity level probably will be relatively low in most
cases. The Act makes the arbitrary and capricious test the appropriate
formula to use and the comments above concerning the appropriate
level of intensity under that test are generally applicable here. Cer-
tainly, any judicial appraisal of the rationality of an agency's decision
not to act must be sensitive to the special problems of priority setting
and resource allocation which may lie behind a particular case of
agency inaction.396 Where inaction is the result of determinations of
this sort, a court should proceed with great caution.
Where an agency has refused to exercise its discretion as required by
law, we have seen that section 574 authorizes courts to compel agency
action. At the same time, the section makes clear that not only must
judges respect agency discretion, but that agency lapses are not to be
cured by judicial substitution; the usual remedy is remand:
In reviewing matters within agency discretion, the court shall limit its
function to assuring that the agency has exercised its discretion in
accordance with law, and shall not itself undertake to exercise the dis-
cretion .... The court shall remand to the agency for modification of
agency action, unless remand is impracticable or would cause unneces-
sary delay.39 7
F. Enforcement
L Enforcement by the Agency
Sections 578 through 594 contain the procedure by which agencies
can seek civil enforcement of rules and orders. Agencies proceed by
394. Id. § 34.05.574(1).
395. Id. § 34.05.582(3). In addition to these means ofjudicial review of inaction, the new Act
provides some legislative oversight of some forms of agency inaction. See id. § 34.05.640.
396. Sunstein, supra note 386, at 672-75.
397. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.574(1) (Supp. 1988).
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petition for civil enforcement in the superior court, venue being deter-
mined as in civil cases generally. 398 The record in an enforcement
action is the same as the record on judicial review.399
2. Enforcement by Private Parties
If the agency which issued the order has chosen not to enforce it,
persons with standing can petition for its enforcement.' This author-
ity is new and is patterned on a provision of the Model Act." 1 Notice
that this authority extends to agency orders but does not apply to
agency rules; presumably an agency refusal to enforce a rule can be
reached only by a petition for review and by a showing that the inac-
tion is arbitrary or capricious.4 2
With respect to orders, the agency's "prosecutorial discretion" is
protected in several ways. First, the outside petitioner must give the
agency 60 days notice prior to filing the petition. This permits the
agency to consider whether enforcement is desirable. If the agency
commences enforcement action within the sixty days, the private peti-
tion cannot be filed." 3 Second, only persons with standing can peti-
tion for enforcement of an agency order. As has been indicated
earlier,' the provisions governing standing4°5 are relatively strict.
They also leave a court with some discretion and thus provide a fur-
ther filter to protect agency discretion. Finally, the agency on motion
is entitled to a dismissal of the outside petition unless the petitioner can
show that the agency acted arbitrarily in refusing to enforce the
order.4 °6 For the reasons suggested earlier," 7 refusals to enforce
based credibly on agency decisions about priorities and resources sel-
dom will appear arbitrary to a court.4 8
398. Id. § 34.05.578.
399. Id. § 34.05.590(2). The record in judicial review is described in id. § 34.05.566.
400. Id. § 34.05.582.
401. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 5-202.
402. See supra notes 387-400 and accompanying text (discussion of review of agency
inaction).
403. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.582(1)(b) (Supp. 1988).
404. See supra notes 262-275 and accompanying text (discussion of standing).
405. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.530 (Supp. 1988).
406. Id. § 34.05.582(3).
407. See supra notes 387-400 and accompanying text (discussion of inaction).
408. Privately enforced actions under this section cannot be the basis for a judicial award of
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3. Defenses in Enforcement Proceedings
In the absence of special statutory provisions, it would seem that the
legality of an agency action is a condition of judicial authority to
enforce it."°9 It would follow that questions about an order's legality
could always be raised as a defense in a judicial proceeding to enforce
the order. On the other hand, where there is statutory authority for
direct judicial review of agency orders, there is practical good sense in
a requirement that a party should ordinarily seek that way of challeng-
ing the legality of agency action, allowing later enforcement actions to
proceed in a summary fashion. That seems to be the general principle
in the federal cases4 1° though in the case of rules, a person's failure to
use existing procedures to seek pre-enforcement review does not usu-
ally preclude the person from raising questions about the rule's legality
in a later enforcement proceeding.411 Of course, if the alternative
means of raising the issue is not considered exclusive by the court, the
defendant apparently can choose the forum in which to raise the
issue.412
Even where it is generally agreed that issues not raised earlier are
waived, a party still should be able to raise in an enforcement proceed-
ing an issue that reasonably could not have been raised earlier. The
Model Act treats the question by simply incorporating in the enforce-
ment-defense section the standards from earlier sections which deter-
mined when issues not raised before the agency could be raised for the
first time on judicial review.413 Thus, under the Model Act, a party
can raise a defense in an enforcement proceeding if the defense arose
from facts a party did not know and was under no duty to discover, or
if the defense arose from a change in law or from agency action that
took place after entry of the order being reviewed.
409. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 553.
410. See, eg., United States v. Sykes, 310 F.2d 417 (5th Cir 1962). Typical federal statutes
seem to contemplate such a result in providing that an order is "final" when the time for direct
review has expired. See, eg., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(c), 45(g) (1982).
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 552.
411. Deering-Milliken v. OSHA, 630 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1980); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
31, at 553.
412. Compare Public Employee Relations Comm'n v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d 832,
839, 664 P.2d 1240, 1244 (1983) (subsequent detailed statutory scheme renders APA review not
exclusive and defendant who did not seek review under the APA can raise legality as defense in
enforcement proceeding; review, however, will be "limited") with Boch v. Pilotage Comm'rs, 91
Wash. 2d 94, 97-98, 586 P.2d 1173, 1175 (1978) (APA is exclusive remedy and court is without
jurisdiction to entertain mandamus action). See supra notes 250-254 and accompanying text
(discussing when the judicial review provisions of the new Act are exclusive).
413. MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 5-203, referring to §§ 5-112 through 5-114.
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Since the new Washington Act contains a similar issue-limiting pro-
vision on direct review, 14 the same strategy was open. But agency
concerns that the Model Act approach opened up too many defenses
at the enforcement stage led the legislature to attempt a more limited
approach. The reader can examine the resulting section 586415 and
judge whether the additional restrictions and the resulting complexity
really constitute an improvement.
Looking generally at the section, it first identifies which defenses
cannot be raised in enforcement proceedings: Issues the defendant
could have raised before a reviewing court or agency and did not, or
issues that were raised before those bodies but were unsuccessful.416
This means that any defense a party knew about and failed to appeal is
foreclosed in a later enforcement action. It also means that if the
party did appeal from the agency action, but lost, the defense cannot
be raised again in an enforcement proceeding. It will remain to be
seen whether this provision is too restrictive. One might conceive of a
situation where in the face of certain and imminent enforcement pro-
ceedings, a party decides to forgo the additional expense of separate
judicial review, intending to present his other defenses in the forth-
coming enforcement proceeding. The section seems to state that the
defenses are waived in such a case and it is not at all clear that this is
either fair or efficient. This section bears careful legislative
monitoring.
Having excluded defenses a party could have raised earlier, we are
left with defenses a party had no opportunity to raise below. One
might suppose that a party who had no opportunity to raise a defense
before the agency or in a reviewing court ought to be allowed to raise
it during an enforcement proceeding no matter what the nature of the
issues it presented. But the Act continues its relentless restriction.
Under the provisions of the Act, a party in this situation can raise
issues of constitutionality, statutory authority, procedural regularity,
and bias. 417 But the party cannot raise issues about the substantiality
of the evidence supporting the order or about whether it is arbitrary or
capricious.
The wisdom of depriving a party of these defenses is not clear. Nor,
for that matter, is the utility. One doubts that a court really would
414. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.05.554, .562 (Supp. 1988) (discussed supra at notes 300-305
and accompanying text).
415. Id. § 34.05.586.
416. Id. § 34.05.586(1).
417. Assuming, as the Act requires, that the party did not know and could not reasonably
have discovered facts giving rise to the issues. Id. § 34.05.586.
Vol. 64:781, 1989
Washington Administrative Procedure Act
enforce an admittedly arbitrary agency order against a party who had
no opportunity to defend. Judges tend to take a more functional view.
When faced with elaborate arguments about which defenses were per-
missible in an labor board enforcement action, Justice Stafford once
observed: "The parties have argued at length about which rules...
should prevail; however, we decline merely to choose one .... Rather,
we find it necessary to determine what kind of judicial review will best
serve the labor relations policy of this state. 4 18
The Model Act approach was much simpler and seemed to the leg-
islature to be the correct approach when deciding which issues not
raised before the agency could be raised for the first time on judicial
review. Their use in determining which issues can be raised in
enforcement would seem sensible.
VII. CONCLUSION
To the reader who has struggled through to the end of this Article,
it must finally be clear that an act of this comprehensiveness incorpo-
rates a number of diverse values, compromises, and tradeoffs. None of
the Act's solutions can be regarded as final. With experience under
the Act, necessary modifications will be identified, proposed, debated,
and enacted. In this necessary process of adjustment, it can be hoped
that any needed amendments can remain consistent with the underly-
ing policies of the new Act. Adaptations to new circumstances will be
necessary. Corrections of obvious error or oversights cannot be
avoided. But piece-meal exemptions and exclusions at the instance of
special pleaders-from inside or outside government-should be
watched with great care or else the clear legislative wish for compre-
hensiveness and clarity will be compromised.
Washington is not well equipped to manage this kind of monitoring
over time. The subject of administrative procedure does not enlist the
enthusiasms of the people, no matter its importance to them. Our his-
tory shows the problems. As recounted above, the old act was
amended several times. In each instance, the change seemed to be at
the insistence of a particular interest group-inside or outside govern-
ment-and there did not seem to be any place for objective appraisal
of the change. From today's vantage point, the changes tended to run
contrary to the underlying legislative preference for clarity and
simplicity.
418. Public Employee Relations Comm'n v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d 832, 839, 664
P.2d 1240, 1244 (1983).
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Perhaps it is time in Washington for some relatively permanent
body of advisors on administrative procedure. At the federal level, we
have the excellent Administrative Conference of the United States,
created twenty-five years ago by Congress and performing useful study
and evaluative work. While Washington may not need a full time offi-
cial agency to do this task, some form of objective and continuing
instrumentality would be very useful. The representatives of regulated
parties cannot be expected to perform this task with objectivity. And
the office of the Attorney General-an otherwise likely place for such
a function, given its expertise-too easily falls into the role of defend-
ing agencies. What is needed is a knowledgeable body which repre-
sents the people of the state, not the agencies or the regulated parties.
Continued improvement in the quality of our governmental
processes-which cost so greatly and affect so many-would seem to
warrant some modest provision toward this end.
